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### OFF---Topicality---1NC

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### The ‘core’ antitrust laws are Sherman, Clayton, and FTC

Michael A. Rataj 21, PC, Law Degree from the Detroit College of Law, “Consequences for Breaking Antitrust Laws”, 5/12/2021, https://www.michaelrataj.com/blog/2021/05/consequences-for-breaking-antitrust-laws/

The core antitrust laws are…

The three core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act primarily prohibits unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization. Those who are in violation of the Sherman Act may face hefty fines, up to $100 million, and up to 10 years behind bars.

The FTC Act prohibits unfair practices or acts and unfair approaches to harming competition. Only the FTC can file cases under this act. The Clayton Act is a catch-all that covers every practice not covered by the Sherman and FTC Acts. Then consequences for violations of both of these acts are usually civil in nature.

#### ‘Expanding the scope’ must increase the area covered by antitrust law

Cesar A. Noble 17, Judge on the Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford Judicial District, 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4178, \*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. August 1, 2017), 8/1/2017, Lexis

The defendant relies upon §7-249 as authority for the supplemental assessment. The statute provides that "[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment." The parties dispute whether the conversion of the property constitutes a construction or expansion of buildings or structures granting authority to the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argues that because the conversion did not constitute an expansion, that is, an increase in the volume or physical area of a building the defendant had no authority under §7-249 for the supplemental assessment. 5 In the view of the plaintiff it is significant that the conversion did not increase the physical footprint or interior square footage of the property in any way including by a vertical [\*5] enlargement. Absent such an increase, asserts the plaintiff, there can be no construction or expansion of any building or structure. The defendant assert that the construction of the 285 new residential units constitute new structures within the plain meaning of §7-249. The court agrees with the defendant.

[FOOTNOTE]

5 The plaintiff relies upon the definition of the word "expand" found in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002) of "to open up; to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of."

#### Violation---the affirmative doesn’t defend prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### The impact is clash---debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics---they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world---this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on praxis, and by not defending a clear actor and mechanism we lose 90% of negative ground, and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible---clash is an intrinsic good and it’s vital to the overall practice of debate. Every debater is here for different reasons, but they trace back to the pedagogical uniqueness of the space. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

### OFF---Blockchain CP---1NC

#### The United States federal government should prohibit anticompetitive practices by nucleus participants at the root layer of blockchains.

#### Anticompetitive exclusions and lack of legal certainty over the applicability of antitrust dry up investment and innovation, artificially centralizing digital ecosystems---applying antitrust solves

Dr. Thibault Schrepel 21, PhD in Antitrust Law from Université Paris-Saclay, LLM in International Law and Legal Studies from the Brooklyn Law School, Associate Professor of Law at VU Amsterdam University, Faculty Affiliate and Creator and Director of the Computational Antitrust Project at the Stanford University CodeX Center, Blockchain + Antitrust: The Decentralization Formula, p. 74-77

2 THE SPECTER OF NEUTRALIZATION

I hope to have convinced readers that antitrust law and blockchain contribute to similar, if not identical, objectives (i.e., preserving agents’ ability to act freely in the market, which entails the decentralization of decision-making processes).42 For that reason, one might expect that both communities would work hand in hand to achieve decentralization. And yet, despite pursuing a common goal, blockchain and antitrust may end up canceling each other out. Here’s why.

2.1 One Goal, Two Methods

Blockchain seeks the decentralization of decision making by eliminating intermediaries, while antitrust aims to achieve it by eliminating anticompetitive practices. They converge toward the same objective. That said, one should not be candid about how easy it will be to make them cooperate. First, the Sherman Act is concerned with trusts43 - hence the name “anti-trust”. Since there is no trustee in the sense of a third-party fiduciary in blockchain’s first layers, the target of antitrust laws is absent.44 Blockchain may thus undermine the *raison d'etre* of antitrust law, which will trigger epidermal reactions.

Furthermore, blockchain and antitrust may at times attack each other. Blockchain may be used to implement anticompetitive practices and be enforcement resistant, while antitrust may reinforce the role of intermediaries in the economy (by protecting them from different forms of anticompetitive exclusions) and label various blockchain behaviors as anticompetitive - regardless of the overall usefulness of these blockchain features.

In fact, antitrust law and blockchain ecosystems seek decentralization at two different levels. Antitrust law prohibits certain categories of conduct, creating tensions with tech communities without focusing much on digital architectures. Blockchain, on the contrary, seeks to decentralize by providing its users with a specific digital architecture. It does not prohibit (anticompetitive) practices where code allows. This creates tensions between them, as I show in Part 2 of this book. Their cooperation will require the identification of ways to deal with these mutual provocations, as I will explain in Part 3.

As things stand, both of these communities exhibit what Veblen called “trained incapacity” - the difficulty to think beyond a set of constraints and assumptions. Policymakers tend to believe that the law should be the most important constraint organizing our lives. For that reason, legal rules are often applied without looking for ways to coordinate with other constraints, including digital architectures.45 In the meantime, blockchain communities tend to view legal enforcement as an adversary, and not as an ally. As John Perry Barlow stated in 1996: “I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.” After all, the law liberates, but it also implies illegality, lawsuits, liability assignment and sanctions. The antitrust and blockchain communities will gain from over- coming these biases.

2.2 The (Long) Road Ahead

If we want antitrust and blockchain to collaborate on a long-term basis, we need to talk about the problems that their cooperation will encounter along the way. The challenge before us is intricate.46 On the one hand, it is a matter of getting legal minds to recognize that technology can help achieve objectives that the law cannot achieve on its own. There are three reasons for this. First, blockchain provides a technical approach to the subject. It serves as a framework for decentralizing the economy by default, while antitrust mostly applies ex post by correcting past behaviors.47

Second, antitrust agencies’ detection rate remains low, meaning that illegal behavior often goes unpunished.48 And enforcement is costly, which makes it impossible to pursue all potentially illegal practices. This is particularly problematic in a world where illegal practices can be implemented through coding that quietly and immediately affects billions of users. Also, the rule of law is (unfortunately) inapplicable in some places. This is the case when the state bypasses legal constraints,49 and when jurisdictions are mutually unfriendly and do not enforce foreign laws.50 For example, enforcement of U.S. court judgments abroad can prove especially difficult in light of divergent rules on jurisdiction, requirements for special service of process, reciprocity and some foreign countries’ public policy concerns,51 including in Europe.52

Finally, antitrust law is complex and cannot be fully mastered by all companies - the compliance costs are high and many firms unwittingly infringe the law. Blockchains could therefore supplement antitrust by creating an architecture that leads to fewer anticompetitive practices.

On the other hand, blockchain communities would gain from working with (not against) antitrust law enforcers. That is because antitrust would eliminate practices that artificially centralize blockchain ecosystems and that blockchain architecture cannot stop or prevent. 1 will analyze them in Part 2. Doing so would also provide legal certainty, thus fostering investments and benefiting all the actors involved in commercial activities that rely on blockchain. For these reasons, one should think of antitrust and blockchain as allies - not enemies - as they both seek the same objective, while presenting complementary strengths and defects. Doing so would lead policymakers to promote and implement a new “law + technology” approach that recognizes that the benefits of cooperation outweigh those of one-off confrontations. A game theorist would represent that approach as illustrated in Figure 5.1.

#### Expanding blockchain massively boosts the economy

Kieran Brown 19, Senior Managing Consultant in London with the Berkeley Research Group, Michael Jelen, Director in the Global Applied Technology Practice at the Berkeley Research Group, and Nabil Manzoor, Director of Health Technology at PwC, “Blockchain Could Unleash Economic Growth—But Only if Governments Step Up with Clear Policy and Leadership”, ThinkSet Magazine, 6/27/2021, https://thinksetmag.com/insights/blockchain-econ-growth

Blockchain Could Unleash Economic Growth—But Only if Governments Step Up with Clear Policy and Leadership

The technology could revolutionize security and transparency, but only if we trust it. That’s where the government comes in.

Blockchain has a trust problem. Or, at least, a *perceived* trust problem.

A decade after the ascents of Bitcoin and later Ethereum, the technology behind those cryptocurrencies—blockchain, a distributed electronic database that records and automates transactions—is still widely misunderstood among the public and even within boardrooms. It’s too often conflated with the unruly markets of cryptocurrencies, enveloping blockchain in a cloud of mistrust and confusion.

The perception that blockchain can’t be trusted is both unfortunate and inaccurate. It’s also preventing blockchain from achieving its potential as a technology that could radically improve transparency and security across a broad range of industries in the public and private sectors.

Getting past blockchain’s trust problem is the key to unlocking the technology’s enormous potential. And the best, fastest way to do that is through regulation and smart policymaking. That might sound like anathema to free-market hawks and cyberlibertarians, but proactive government involvement doesn’t have to be the government-dominated, centrally controlled nightmare they fear. Rather, it is the crucial ingredient needed to unlock this emerging technology’s potential, allowing innovation and business to flourish.

Blockchain beyond crypto

It’s ironic that blockchain, a technology designed to promote trust in transactions, still faces questions about trust. But it’s becoming increasingly clear that many trust issues facing blockchain stem from a lack of understanding.

What’s crucial for business leaders and the general public to understand is that blockchain technology completely transforms the concept of trust (for the better). Trust, of course, is an essential part of how economies and markets operate. It enables and facilitates transactions that create value. Therefore, through the lens of economic theory, blockchain represents a new way of answering an age-old question: How can we create enough trust to peacefully, efficiently enable parties to exchange something of value?

Blockchain is really just a distributed electronic database of transactions, individually secured with a mathematical signature (block) and then linked together (chain). As the MIT Technology Review editors put it, “blockchains distributed across thousands of computers can mechanize trust, opening the door to new ways of organizing ‘decentralized’ enterprises and institutions.” The potential to increase and mechanize the number and efficacy of trusted transactions is enormous. And the more transactions that can be verified (deemed trustworthy) and automated, the more economic opportunities will emerge.

Blockchain is really just a distributed electronic database of transactions, individually secured with a mathematical signature (block) and then linked together (chain).

Blockchain’s ability to enable the frictionless transfer of assets is revealing itself rapidly in fascinating functions in the private and public sectors. Blockchain applications are involved with managing complex shipping and logistical issues at international ports (Maqta Gateway in Abu Dhabi and the Port of Antwerp in the Netherlands), providing a transparent record of trading activity on the Australian stock market and securing end-to-end transactions as part of a pilot program by the UK Land Registry.

Those functions should be viewed as at least as indicative of blockchain’s potential as Bitcoin. But instead, the technology’s conflation with cryptocurrency has created an association with volatile markets, spectacular risk and unsavory dark-web actors—and not the mathematical structure that relies on decentralized nodes for recording and storing data to allow for greater transparency, auditability and security.

Governments, policymakers and regulators are positioned to confer trust and legitimacy on blockchain—and to unlock its transformative economic potential—by promoting its adoption and developing best-use cases. To do this effectively, they need to invest in human capital, subject-matter expertise, a clear permission policy framework and governance. They must educate not only themselves on the applications of blockchain technology, but also their citizens.

How governments can lead expanding blockchain application

The internet’s utility and value aren’t limited to any single industry—it’s a general-purpose technology that has supported an explosion of economic activity and opportunity across every industry around the world. Likewise, we’re starting to see blockchain’s myriad applications beyond the financial sector.

Blockchain has the potential to radically upend traditional business models in a number of different areas: supply chain logistics, fair trade practices, property transactions, personal identity management and government, to name a few. Supply chain matters, where blockchain has made its first inroads outside of the financial sector, involve a complex series of transactions that move through multiple parties and transactions, each with its own contract and fulfillment terms. Blockchain enables the parties to automate and verify fulfilment of the terms at every step along the way, and to send and record payments instantly.

#### Decline cascades---nuclear war

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Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

INTRODUCTION

The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach.

METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

• Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);

• Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and

• Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

### OFF---Heg DA---1NC

#### Military readiness solves every threat, but decline emboldens rivals and causes miscalc and arms races that escalate.

Hal Brands 18. Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Ph.D. in history from Yale University. “Chapter 6: Does America Have Enough Hard Power?” American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump; pp. 129-133.

Much contemporary commentary favors the first option—reducing commitments—and denounces the third as financially ruinous and perhaps impossible.5 Yet significantly expanding American capabilities would not be nearly as economically onerous as it may seem. Compared to the alternatives, in fact, this approach represents the best option for sustaining American primacy and preventing a slide into strategic bankruptcy that will eventually be punished. Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades. Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch. Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.

#### Russian expansion installs a global white supremacist empire.

Lee Edwin **Coursey 18**. International affairs and history analyst and software engineer in the field of artificial intelligence. 01-07-18. “Russia’s Plan for World Domination – and America’s Unwitting Cooperation With It.” LeeCoWeb. https://www.leecoweb.com/russian\_plan/

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia experienced a crushing recession that left millions unemployed. The subsequent vacuum in the decades that followed saw the rapid expansion of the European Union and its single free market eastward. The EU now includes several former Soviet states, including some immediately bordering Russia (e.g., Estonia and Latvia.) More importantly, from a Russian security perspective, the NATO military alliance also expanded aggressively eastward after the Cold War, adding over a dozen European countries as members between 1999 and 2017. This expansion has put NATO allies, and NATO weapons, into countries immediately bordering Russia. The spread of western ideals such as free speech, free and open elections, and multiculturalism into eastern Europe are perceived as a threat to Russian culture and Russian influence. From the Russian point of view, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was both a humiliating defeat and a harsh rebuke of Soviet-style Communism. A new post-Soviet, neo-fascist political philosophy rose from the ashes of Communism, and Russia is actively engaged in pursuing this philosophy. Their goal is nothing less than the creation of a new Eurasian Empire controlled by, and answering to, Russia. A New Blueprint (or “Putin’s To-Do List”) The Russian political elite could not tolerate the growing threat on their western border, but they needed a new geopolitical strategy – one that would establish goals and methods different from those that had failed the Soviet Union. In 1997, Aleksandr Dugin articulated and defined that new Russian strategy in a 600-page treatise entitled Foundations of Geopolitics. According to historian and Hoover Institution specialist John B. Dunlop, “There has probably not been another book published in Russia during the post-communist period which has exerted an influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites comparable to that of Aleksandr Dugin’s 1997 neo-fascist treatise.” The Foundations of Geopolitics sold out in four editions, and continues to be assigned as a textbook at the General Staff Academy and other military universities in Russia. [source] Eurasian-ism As espoused by Dugin, Russia’s ultimate goal should be nothing less than rule of the world by ethnic Russians, based on a Eurasian empire extending from “Dublin to Vladivostok.” The philosophical basis for this empire will include the rejection of “Atlanticism,” identification of America as a common enemy, and refusal to allow traditional liberal political ideals (e.g., freedom of the press, freedom of speech, free markets, civil rights, etc.,) to affect Russia’s society or political system. According to political scientist Andreas Umland, the Russian political elites, headed by Vladimir Putin, view Dugin’s new Eurasian Empire not as a restoration of an idealized Russian Empire, but as a replacement for the Soviet Union. Eurasianism provides an ideological basis for a new form of Russian imperialism. As for strategic stepping stones toward a new Russian empire, Dugin offers a long list objectives. I have listed just a few of these below: Separate the United Kingdom from Europe. Russian annexation of Ukraine. A strategic alliance between Russia and Iran. Create “geopolitical shocks” within Turkey. Russian annexation of Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Finland should be absorbed into Russia. Encourage Germany and France to cooperate with each other and isolate themselves from Europe. Dismember the nation of Georgia. Geopolitical defeat of the United States Sound familiar? In terms of tactics, Foundations of Geopolitics recommends subversion of America and its alliances by encouraging and supporting separatism, isolationism, nationalism, and the creation of factions. It also calls for supporting radical separatist movements in western countries, including support for organizations that espouse extremist, racist, and sectarian ideals. Here is a passage taken directly from Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics (via Dunlop): “It is especially important to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements — extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S. It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics.” Evidence Russia Is Actively Pursuing Dugin’s Strategy Russia’s actions, both overt and covert, offer strong indications that her political and military leaders are actively pursuing the strategy described in Foundations. The overt actions include: Russian invasion of the nation of Georgia (2008.) Russian annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine (2014.) Economic and military support for anti-western regimes in Syria and Iran. As for covert (or disguised) actions by the Russian government in support of the Foundations strategy, consider these recent findings from western intelligence and news agencies: BREXIT: “More than 150,000 Russian-language Twitter accounts posted tens of thousands of messages in English urging Britain to leave the European Union in the days before last year’s referendum on the issue. … Most of the messages sought to inflame fears about Muslims and immigrants to help drive the vote.” – New York Times, 15-NOV-2017 US ELECTIONS: “Posts that circulated to a targeted, swing-state audience on Facebook railed against illegal immigrants and claimed “the only viable option is to elect Trump.” They were shared by what looked like a grassroots American, anti-immigrant group called Secured Borders, but Congressional investigators say the group is actually a Russian fabrication designed to influence American voters during and after the presidential election.” – ABC News, 27-SEP-2017 US ELECTIONS: “Russian agents intending to sow discord among American citizens disseminated inflammatory posts that reached 126 million users on Facebook, published more than 131,000 messages on Twitter and uploaded over 1,000 videos to Google’s YouTube service.” – New York Times, 30-OCT-2017 US ELECTIONS: “In July 2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that access until at least June 2016.” – Findings from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 6-JAN-2017 US SOCIAL UNREST: “Two Russian Facebook pages organized dueling rallies in front of the Islamic Da’wah Center of Houston. Heart of Texas, a Russian-controlled Facebook group that promoted Texas secession, leaned into an image of the state as a land of guns and barbecue and amassed hundreds of thousands of followers. One of their ads on Facebook announced a noon rally on May 21, 2016 to “Stop Islamification of Texas.” A separate Russian-sponsored group, United Muslims of America, advertised a “Save Islamic Knowledge” rally for the same place and time. – The Texas Tribune, 1-NOV-2017 US SOCIAL UNREST: “A social media campaign calling itself “Blacktivist” and linked to the Russian government used both Facebook and Twitter in an apparent attempt to amplify racial tensions during the U.S. presidential election. Both Blacktivist accounts regularly shared content intended to stoke outrage. “Black people should wake up as soon as possible,” one post on the Twitter account read. “Black families are divided and destroyed by mass incarceration and death of black men,” another read. The accounts also posted videos of police violence against African Americans. These fake accounts provide further evidence that Russian-linked social media accounts saw racial tensions as something to be exploited in order to achieve the broader Russian goal of dividing Americans and creating chaos.” CNN, 28-SEP-2017 NOTE TO READERS: Even in light of the information above, I DO NOT necessarily believe that Hillary Clinton would have won the 2016 US Presidential election in the absence of Russian interference – I simply do not have enough data from which to draw that conclusion. I am however certain that Russia wanted Trump to win and spent millions of dollars on propaganda directed at Americans toward that end. How We (Americans) Are Helping Russia Achieve Its Imperialistic Goals Russian propaganda and incitements to separatism are spread through social media, and their success depends on our willingness to reflexively share stories that outrage us. As unwitting agents for Russia, each of us is helping spread the seeds of our own political and economic demise. Hundreds of fake Facebook accounts operating from within Russia purchased $100,000 worth of Facebook ads between mid-2015 and early 2017. These fake Facebook accounts managed to reach 126 million Facebook users during this time frame. Besides their sheer volume, one of the most striking aspects of the ads purchased by these fake accounts is their alignment with the strategy described in Foundations of Geopolitics, namely the creation of division and mistrust among Americans. Alex Stamos, the Chief Information Security Officer for Facebook, issued a statement about the ad placements on September 6, 2017. In it, he made these observations: The vast majority of ads run by these accounts didn’t specifically reference the US presidential election, voting or a particular candidate. Rather, the ads and accounts appeared to focus on amplifying divisive social and political messages across the ideological spectrum — touching on topics from LGBT matters to race issues to immigration to gun rights.

### OFF---PIC---1NC

#### We endorse transnational, crisscrossed networks of anti-nationalist, open public spheres that reimagine just, desirable futures. We should create institutional loci for cosmopolitanism.

#### Refuse institutional loci for internationalism---it requires nationalism AND the existence of the nation-state---turns case.

Dr. Madeleine Herren 1, Director of the Institute / Professor for Modern History Institute for European Global Studies, University of Basel, “Governmental Internationalism and the Beginning of a New World Order in the Late Nineteenth Century”, in The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, p. 125-126

r. Function and Status of the State in the Concept of Internationalism

While the term 'international' had already been used by Jeremy Bentham, the term 'internationalism' was coined in the middle of the nineteenth century,5 or in the late 186os.6 As regards its historical significance, internationalism is usually seen as a special aspect of nineteenth-century pacifism, 7 and as a pursuit of older forms of cosmopolitanism. But there is a significant difference between internationalism and the primarily individualistic cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century. In 1911, Ludwig Stein, a professor of philosophy at Berne, described the history of internationalist ideas as a dialectical development with cosmopolitanism as thesis, nationalism as antithesis, and internationalism as synthesis.8 Therefore, internationalism included nationalism and patriotism, and presented a political alternative both to a nation-dissolving socialist internationalism and a worldwide pacifism. For that reason, the role of the state was of considerable importance in the contemporary debate on internationalism. In the first American thesis on internationalism, the definition included both transnational and governmental aspects. In this thesis Faries described internationalism as 'cooperation between governments or their citizens which tends to coordinate their efforts toward material or moral betterment in the interests of the whole social order' .9 Max Huber, Professor of international law and Swiss delegate to the second Hague Peace Conference, understood internationalism as a general effort to intensify international relations, in the cultural and economic, as well as the political sphere. 10 For Huber, governmental internationalism as an international ordering principle opened the door to a pluralistic world of states. In this sense, governmental internationalism had a national, even a nationalist orientation. It was based on the idea of evolution, but did not necessarily lead to empire-building, since national units could come together through co-operation rather than through conquest.11 Althought Max Huber focused on solidarity and integration as an alternative to the building of empires, 12 internationalism did not exclude expansion. In the contemporary debate, an evolutionary understanding of international relations made internationalism compatible with imperialism, the mainstream of the century.

## Case

### Case---Climate Turn---1NC

#### Nation-state paradigm is necessary for effective climate action.

Anatol Lieven 20, Professor at Georgetown University and senior fellow of the New America Foundation, "Climate Change and the State: A Case for Environmental Realism," Survival, Vol. 62, Issue 2, 03/23/2020, T&F.

The failures of liberal internationalism

Theorists whose thinking derives from the liberal-internationalist and Marxian traditions (such as those working in critical security studies and emancipatory theory) have greater and more fundamental difficulties than realists in accepting the elevation of climate change and its associated challenges as a national-security threat, because this would require them to qualify or abandon their hostility to existing nations, and to the idea of enduring and powerful collective identities.34

These attitudes have had a significant and damaging effect on thinking about action on climate change among environmentalists, since so many of them draw their basic political views from these traditions.35 Concentrating on global agreements and institutions is not wrong in itself, but it tends to downplay three crucial facts: that whatever international agreements are reached will need to be implemented by states; that states will need to be strong enough to implement them; and that democratic and authoritarian states alike will need to motivate their populations to make the sacrifices required. Furthermore, a desire among many activists to emphasise the dire social consequences of climate change, including greatly increased migration, while simultaneously upholding the traditional liberal-internationalist belief that migration is a good thing, has produced analyses of mass migration that are sometimes self-contradictory to the point of unreason.36

It is true that national and ethnic identities, like all collective identities, are not essential or eternal, but change enormously over time; and that national identities are only one form of identity among the many we all possess. But modern history and contemporary experience decisively refute any notion that such identities change quickly, that they can be changed both radically and predictably by elite manipulation, or that they are no more important for politics and political action than any alternative identities. Radical and sudden change in national identities can happen, but usually only in the context of catastrophic transformations such as the French and Russian revolutions or the Second World War, which on the whole we might wish to avoid.37 Most of the time, the development of national identities tends to be relatively slow and unpredictable, and to carry with it legacies of the past.38

Liberal-internationalist and Marxian theoretical approaches are at their core normative or prescriptive (explicitly so in critical security studies and emancipatory theory), and characterised by what Johan Eriksson has called ‘instinctive moralism’.39 Consider, for example, Antonio Franceschet’s definition of ‘human security’:

Human security is a liberal, cosmopolitan idea that individuals, regardless of their citizenship, location and identity ought to be made secure from a range of fears, threats and deprivations … Human security is made intelligible by the politics of applying law and legalism to global politics. Many of the human security discourses and initiatives to have emerged since the end of the Cold War are shaped, mobilised but also limited and constrained, by this wider problematic of the legal constitution of global politics.40

This approach treats human security as a matter of individuals rather than members of societies and citizens of states whose well-being and security depend on the security of their societies as a whole. It ignores the central and inescapable role of states in providing not just physical but social security for their people, and in actually carrying out any agreements made at the international level. In explicitly disregarding the factor of citizenship, it overlooks the duty of care that states owe to their own people, and the solidarity that people feel with their fellow citizens.

Any suggestion that what has been called the ‘primacy of the state’ is necessarily in opposition to ‘human security’ and the well-being of individuals is fundamentally false.41 Of course, prioritising what are presumed to be state interests can have dreadful results, but it is equally true that none of the great advances in collective and individual welfare of the past century – social security and public-health systems among them – could have been achieved without the action of strong states. In the case of limiting climate change, it should be manifestly obvious that only strong and legitimate states will be able to implement changes on the massive scale required. Social and political movements may often play a key role in spurring states to act, but they cannot of themselves either pass or enforce legislation.

In addition, by conceptualising human security in terms of international legal forms, analyses like Franceschet’s colossally overestimate the importance of international law, as opposed to national interests, in shaping state actions. By casting human security as a ‘liberal, cosmopolitan idea’, such thinking alienates both realists and conservative patriots, making it much more difficult to get them to grasp the new and potentially mortal threats to the security and vital interests of their nations. Moreover, the suggestion that an emphasis on states and national identities undermines globalism and global institutions misses the point entirely. Like it or not, the elites of powerful states, backed by burgeoning nationalist sentiment among sizeable portions of their populations, will not in the foreseeable future (if ever) surrender significant economic or legal power to international bodies. As we have seen, even the EU is only a partial exception to this rule. The liberal-internationalist and human-security view of what ought to happen may be noble in itself, but it does not describe what is actually happening, and there is no sign that it will ever happen.

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While appeals to international communities of sentiment have succeeded in mobilising useful activist movements, they have so far failed to move solid majorities of voters in key countries to support policies that will require them to make personal sacrifices. It seems clear, therefore, that if the ruling elites of these countries (and, in democratic states, sufficient numbers of voters) are ever to agree to serious and economically painful measures to limit carbon emissions, they will need to be convinced that the direct and indirect effects of climate change pose a serious threat to the security of their states and regimes.

The expansive mode of Western liberal internationalism, insofar as it ever existed, is now well and truly over. The EU will likely survive, but it is highly improbable that its model will spread. If we wish to resist enormous threats and preserve whatever can be preserved of Western liberal democracy, we need to start thinking in terms of state as well as human survival.

### Case---Nation State Good---1NC

#### Deconstructing the nation-state causes total war in the name of liberal humanitarianism.

Mikkel Thorup 10, Associate Professor at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, “Cosmopolitanism: Sovereignty denied or sovereignty restated?” *International Politics*, Volume 47, Number 6, 2010, pp. 659-679

This article will explore the cosmopolitan critique of the principle of national sovereignty and why it may unwittingly become a cosmopolitanism, which helps to frame and legitimate a new sovereigntist language based on an inequality of recognition and status. The article engages in a critical exploration of the cosmopolitan literature and disscusses the theories of power, sovereignty and conflict that the literature subscribes to and how it informs a particular view on both past, present and future politics.

Basically, what I want to argue is that the cosmopolitan critique of the principle of national sovereignty may not be the critical thinking and practice it believes itself to be. Perhaps cosmopolitans and other critics of state sovereignty are ‘the champions of a new consensus’ (Bickerton et al, 2007, p. 4); a consensus that is ultimately the continuation of Western power. Rather than opposing the powers that be, the critiques may be in conformity with power system trends; and in that case, the cosmopolitan language risks being taken over by other non-cosmopolitan forces using the new post-national, moralist language for power purposes. Facilitating this possible take-over, I will argue, is a deficient understanding of power and of sovereignty’s durability and adaptability coupled with a basically optimistic understanding of historical development. The concrete expression of these understandings is a dichotomous historical view of a sovereign age of war and internal repression and a coming post-sovereign age of cooperation and peace. Somewhat unfair to the diverse standpoint of the cosmopolitans, I argue that this linkage between sovereignty and power and its consequent abolition of both is what informs cosmopolitan thinking, and is what tends to hide from cosmopolitans the reconfiguration of sovereignty in a post-nation state age. Perhaps one could say that it is the coupling of sovereignty, power and state that obscures how both power and sovereignty re-establish themselves in – among others – humanitarian and cosmopolitan languages and institutions.

Post-sovereignty is the powerful new language of intervention because it comes with the assumption of not having any expansionist or nationally egoistic purposes with the intervention. Post-sovereign language excludes all the currently illegitimate motives for war and intervention, thereby making going to war easier rather than more difficult. What we have witnessed – and which is obviously not the fault of cosmopolitans and the likeminded – is a basic change in what can legitimate an armed response (Finnemore, 2003). In addition to the older requirements for legitimate international violence – clear and present danger, all peaceful means exhausted, contained violence and so on – the new minimum requirements for legitimate post-sovereign international violence are based on the following standpoints:

unilateralism is suspicious and a very last resort only;

the goal must be universal and not national;

the intervention must not result in any material gains for the intervening

party;

international norms and institutions must sanction the intervention.

Most of these requirements exclude the classical sovereign motives for war – honour, land, resources, and so on – and in that sense makes war more difficult. But they also facilitate war because they render some interventions not only legitimate, but perhaps also morally required. Once activated the post- sovereign, humanitarian language can authorize and legitimate violence like no other language. And the reference to the old reasons for war becomes a legitimization of the new post-sovereign wars because the argument now is that the old wars were fought for basically nationally egotistical and non-legitimate reasons, whereas the new wars are grounded in the opposite, namely in the nationally indifferent and morally superior.

The humanitarian sovereign and the post-national state may emerge through the fog of humanitarian wars. Ju ̈ rgen Habermas has called the intervention in Kosovo an ‘anticipation of an effective cosmopolitan law’ (in Mendieta, 2004, p. 86). Ironically, Kosovo Polje is now the cradle of Serbian nationalism and of liberal globalism. It is telling that this birth was made possible through the breaking of international law. This is exactly the placing of morality over law that Habermas, as we saw earlier, warns against in the actions of America. But here, in the name of global justice, as interpreted from Europe, another principle applies. In an interview, Habermas scorns America for breaking international law in the Iraq war, but then continues about the war in Kosovo:

Still there were two legitimizing reasons, one formal and one informal and this is so even if they couldn’t replace the consent by the Security Council required by the UN charter. Firstly, one could refer to the erga omnes – which applies to all states – and calls for help in the face of an imminent genocide. This has always been a part of international customary law. Secondly, the fact that NATO is a union of liberal states, that it in its inner workings takes the UN declaration of human rights seriously, can also be thrown on the scale [in favour of intervention]. Compare that with the ‘coalition of the willing’ that has split the West and which included such despicable regimes as Usbekistan and Taylor’s Liberia. (Habermas in Mendieta, 2004, p. 86)

The first reason has turned out to be at least questionable. The second reason is really interesting. One has to interpret Habermas as saying that if the European NATO countries had joined the Iraq war, then the disregard for UN law had been justified. The West is effectively the international community – the problem is the ‘splitting of the West’, as one of his books is called (Habermas, 2004). One might wonder if Germany and France would not have claimed that the ‘international community’ was waging a war against Iraq, if they had been part of the coalition? Liberals speaking on behalf of the international community or humanity is a lot like Nixon speaking on behalf of the silent majority. It gives an authority without accountability; it is an unsubstantiated claim of representation. But, of course, not everyone can speak in the name of something/someone universal and be taken seriously. The interstate system at least guaranteed that sovereigns were considered legitimate voices of their communities, giving the system an aura of accountability and equality. This is what the discussion of Carl Schmitt taught us: The imperialism of voice, or the dominance of interpretation (Thorup, 2006a). The core of the matter is that the West once again and with remarkably similar arguments (minus the racism (sort of) but certainly still with ‘the white man’s burden’) is proclaiming a ‘historic responsibility’, ‘duty of global leadership’, and so on to remake societies and the structure of relations among societies. This inevitably gives rise to a new imperialism, humanitarian or liberal, as the quest is out once again for remaking the world in Western colours. Post-sovereignty is now to be everyone’s reality.

The new post-sovereign language, often thought to be a language of peace, is also the new language of war. In his self-critical book, The Dark Sides of Virtue. Reassessing International Humanitarianism, David Kennedy says:

The human rights movement consistently underestimates the usefulness of the human rights vocabulary and machinery for people whose hearts are hard and whose political projects are repressive. The United States, The United Kingdom, Russia – but also Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians – have taken military action, intervened politically, and justified their governmental policies on the grounds of protecting human rights. Far from being a defense of the individual against the state, human rights has become a standard part of the justification for the external use of force by the state against other states and individuals. (Kennedy, 2004, p. 25)

He goes on to say that ‘humanitarian rulership is so often rulership denied’ (Kennedy, 2004, p. 329), and just as the blurring of the boundaries between policing and warfare, or humanitarianism and militarism first and foremost makes policing and humanitarianism part of the military arsenal, Kennedy says, that the present humanitarian language spoken by power is making human rights a smaller part of governance ‘as it makes humanitarianism the voice of sovereignty’ (Kennedy, 2004, p. 344).

Cosmopolitans help frame the new post-sovereign language of dominance and intervention by not being attentive enough to the ‘new alliance of humanitarian and military interest’ (Kennedy, 2004, p. xii). The modern nation state was born in and through war; so is the post-national. The new wars are frontier wars, and they are instrumental in reinstating order by drawing new distinctions between the West and the rest, between order and chaos, the civilized and the barbaric, between friends and enemies.

#### Nation-state paradigm is broadly beneficial---BUT there is absolutely no ALT.

Andreas Wimmer 19, Lieber Professor of Sociology and Political Philosophy at Columbia University, "Why Nationalism Works," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2019-02-12/why-nationalism-works.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the world has become a world of nation-states governed according to nationalist principles. Identifying nationalism exclusively with the political right means misunderstanding the nature of nationalism and ignoring how deeply it has shaped almost all modern political ideologies, including liberal and progressive ones. It has provided the ideological foundation for institutions such as democracy, the welfare state, and public education, all of which were justified in the name of a unified people with a shared sense of purpose and mutual obligation. Nationalism was one of the great motivating forces that helped beat back Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. And nationalists liberated the large majority of humanity from European colonial domination.

Nationalism is not an irrational sentiment that can be banished from contemporary politics through enlightening education; it is one of the modern world’s foundational principles and is more widely accepted than its critics acknowledge. Who in the United States would agree to be ruled by French noblemen? Who in Nigeria would publicly call for the British to come back?

THE NATION IS BORN

Nationalism is a relatively recent invention. In 1750, vast multinational empires—Austrian, British, Chinese, French, Ottoman, Russian, and Spanish—governed most of the world. But then came the American Revolution, in 1775, and the French Revolution, in 1789. The doctrine of nationalism—rule in the name of a nationally defined people—spread gradually across the globe. Over the next two centuries, empire after empire dissolved into a series of nation-states. In 1900, roughly 35 percent of the globe’s surface was governed by nation-states; by 1950, it was already 70 percent. Today, only half a dozen dynastic kingdoms and theocracies remain.

Where did nationalism come from, and why did it prove so popular? Its roots reach back to early modern Europe. European politics in this period—roughly, the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries—was characterized by intense warfare between increasingly centralized, bureaucratic states. By the end of the eighteenth century, these states had largely displaced other institutions (such as churches) as the main providers of public goods within their territory, and they had eliminated or co-opted competing centers of power, such as the independent nobility. The centralization of power, moreover, promoted the spread of a common language within each state, at least among the literate, and provided a shared focus for the emerging civil society organizations that were then becoming preoccupied with matters of state.

Europe’s competitive and war-prone multistate system drove rulers to extract ever more taxes from their populations and to expand the role of commoners in the military. This, in turn, gave commoners leverage to demand from their rulers increased political participation, equality before the law, and better provision of public goods. In the end, a new compact emerged: that rulers should govern in the population’s interests, and that as long as they did so, the ruled owed them political loyalty, soldiers, and taxes. Nationalism at once reflected and justified this new compact. It held that the rulers and the ruled both belonged to the same nation and thus shared a common historical origin and future political destiny. Political elites would look after the interests of the common people rather than those of their dynasty.

Why was this new model of statehood so attractive? Early nation-states—France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States—quickly became more powerful than the old dynastic kingdoms and empires. Nationalism allowed rulers to raise more taxes from the ruled and to count on their political loyalty. Perhaps most important, nation-states proved able to defeat empires on the battlefield. Universal military conscription—invented by the revolutionary government of France—enabled nation-states to recruit massive armies whose soldiers were motivated to fight for their fatherland. From 1816 to 2001, nation-states won somewhere between 70 and 90 percent of their wars with empires or dynastic states.

As the nation-states of western Europe and the United States came to dominate the international system, ambitious elites around the world sought to match the West’s economic and military power by emulating its nationalist political model. Perhaps the most famous example is Japan, where in 1868, a group of young Japanese noblemen overthrew the feudal aristocracy, centralized power under the emperor, and embarked on an ambitious program to transform Japan into a modern, industrialized nation-state—a development known as the Meiji Restoration. Only one generation later, Japan was able to challenge Western military power in East Asia.

Nationalism did not spread only because of its appeal to ambitious political elites, however. It was also attractive for the common people, because the nation-state offered a better exchange relationship with the government than any previous model of statehood had. Instead of graduated rights based on social status, nationalism promised the equality of all citizens before the law. Instead of restricting political leadership to the nobility, it opened up political careers to talented commoners. Instead of leaving the provision of public goods to guilds, villages, and religious institutions, nationalism brought the power of the modern state to bear in promoting the common good. And instead of perpetuating elite contempt for the uncultured plebs, nationalism elevated the status of the common people by making them the new source of sovereignty and by moving popular culture to the center of the symbolic universe.

THE BENEFITS OF NATIONALISM

In countries where the nationalist compact between the rulers and the ruled was realized, the population came to identify with the idea of the nation as an extended family whose members owed one another loyalty and support. Where rulers held up their end of the bargain, that is, citizens embraced a nationalist vision of the world. This laid the foundation for a host of other positive developments.

One of these was democracy, which flourished where national identity was able to supersede other identities, such as those centered on religious, ethnic, or tribal communities. Nationalism provided the answer to the classic boundary question of democracy: Who are the people in whose name the government should rule? By limiting the franchise to members of the nation and excluding foreigners from voting, democracy and nationalism entered an enduring marriage.

At the same time as nationalism established a new hierarchy of rights between members (citizens) and nonmembers (foreigners), it tended to promote equality within the nation itself. Because nationalist ideology holds that the people represent a united body without differences of status, it reinforced the Enlightenment ideal that all citizens should be equal in the eyes of the law. Nationalism, in other words, entered into a symbiotic relationship with the principle of equality. In Europe, in particular, the shift from dynastic rule to the nation-state often went hand in hand with a transition to a representative form of government and the rule of law. These early democracies initially restricted full legal and voting rights to male property owners, but over time, those rights were extended to all citizens of the nation—in the United States, first to poor white men, then to white women and people of color.

Nationalism also helped establish modern welfare states. A sense of mutual obligation and shared political destiny popularized the idea that members of the nation—even perfect strangers—should support one another in times of hardship. The first modern welfare state was created in Germany during the late nineteenth century at the behest of the conservative chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who saw it as a way to ensure the working class’ loyalty to the German nation rather than the international proletariat. The majority of Europe’s welfare states, however, were established after periods of nationalist fervor, mostly after World War II in response to calls for national solidarity in the wake of shared suffering and sacrifice.

BLOODY BANNERS

Yet as any student of history knows, nationalism also has a dark side. Loyalty to the nation can lead to the demonization of others, whether foreigners or allegedly disloyal domestic minorities. Globally, the rise of nationalism has increased the frequency of war: over the last two centuries, the foundation of the first nationalist organization in a country has been associated with an increase in the yearly probability of that country experiencing a full-scale war, from an average of 1.1 percent to an average of 2.5 percent.

About one-third of all contemporary states were born in a nationalist war of independence against imperial armies. The birth of new nation-states has also been accompanied by some of history’s most violent episodes of ethnic cleansing, generally of minorities that were considered disloyal to the nation or suspected of collaborating with its enemies. During the two Balkan wars preceding World War I, newly independent Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia divided up the European parts of the Ottoman Empire among themselves, expelling millions of Muslims across the new border into the rest of the empire. Then, during World War I, the Ottoman government engaged in massive killings of Armenian civilians. During World War II, Hitler’s vilification of the Jews—whom he blamed for the rise of Bolshevism, which he saw as a threat to his plans for a German empire in eastern Europe—eventually led to the Holocaust. After the end of that war, millions of German civilians were expelled from the newly re-created Czechoslovakian and Polish states. And in 1947, massive numbers of Hindus and Muslims were killed in communal violence when India and Pakistan became independent states.

Ethnic cleansing is perhaps the most egregious form of nationalist violence, but it is relatively rare. More frequent are civil wars, fought either by nationalist minorities who wish to break away from an existing state or between ethnic groups competing to dominate a newly independent state. Since 1945, 31 countries have experienced secessionist violence and 28 have seen armed struggles over the ethnic composition of the national government.

INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE

Although nationalism has a propensity for violence, that violence is unevenly distributed. Many countries have remained peaceful after their transition to a nation-state. Understanding why requires focusing on how governing coalitions emerge and how the boundaries of the nation are drawn. In some countries, majorities and minorities are represented in the highest levels of the national government from the outset. Switzerland, for instance, integrated French-, German-, and Italian-speaking groups into an enduring power-sharing arrangement that no one has ever questioned since the modern state was founded, in 1848. Correspondingly, Swiss nationalist discourse portrays all three linguistic groups as equally worthy members of the national family. There has never been a movement by the French- or the Italian-speaking Swiss minority to secede from the state.

In other countries, however, the state was captured by the elites of a particular ethnic group, who then proceeded to shut other groups out of political power. This raises the specter not just of ethnic cleansing pursued by paranoid state elites but also of secessionism or civil war launched by the excluded groups themselves, who feel that the state lacks legitimacy because it violates the nationalist principle of self-rule. Contemporary Syria offers an extreme example of this scenario: the presidency, the cabinet, the army, the secret service, and the higher levels of the bureaucracy are all dominated by Alawites, who make up just 12 percent of the country’s population. It should come as no surprise that many members of Syria’s Sunni Arab majority have been willing to fight a long and bloody civil war against what they regard as alien rule.

Whether the configuration of power in a specific country developed in a more inclusive or exclusive direction is a matter of history, stretching back before the rise of the modern nation-state. Inclusive ruling coalitions—and a correspondingly encompassing nationalism—have tended to arise in countries with a long history of centralized, bureaucratic statehood. Today, such states are better able to provide their citizens with public goods. This makes them more attractive as alliance partners for ordinary citizens, who shift their political loyalty away from ethnic, religious, and tribal leaders and toward the state, allowing for the emergence of more diverse political alliances. A long history of centralized statehood also fosters the adoption of a common language, which again makes it easier to build political alliances across ethnic divides. Finally, in countries where civil society developed relatively early (as it did in Switzerland), multiethnic alliances for promoting shared interests have been more likely to emerge, eventually leading to multiethnic ruling elites and more encompassing national identities.

BUILDING A BETTER NATIONALISM

Unfortunately, these deep historical roots mean that it is difficult, especially for outsiders, to promote inclusive ruling coalitions in countries that lack the conditions for their emergence, as is the case in many parts of the developing world. Western governments and international institutions, such as the World Bank, can help establish these conditions by pursuing long-term policies that increase governments’ capacity to provide public goods, encourage the flourishing of civil society organizations, and promote linguistic integration. But such policies should strengthen states, not undermine them or seek to perform their functions. Direct foreign help can reduce, rather than foster, the legitimacy of national governments. Analysis of surveys conducted by the Asia Foundation in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2015 shows that Afghans had a more positive view of Taliban violence after foreigners sponsored public goods projects in their districts.

In the United States and many other old democracies, the problem of fostering inclusive ruling coalitions and national identities is different. Sections of the white working classes in these countries abandoned center-left parties after those parties began to embrace immigration and free trade. The white working classes also resent their cultural marginalization by liberal elites, who champion diversity while presenting whites, heterosexuals, and men as the enemies of progress. The white working classes find populist nationalism attractive because it promises to prioritize their interests, shield them from competition from immigrants or lower-paid workers abroad, and restore their central and dignified place in the national culture. Populists didn’t have to invent the idea that the state should care primarily for core members of the nation; it has always been deeply embedded in the institutional fabric of the nation-state, ready to be activated once its potential audience grew large enough.

Overcoming these citizens’ alienation and resentment will require both cultural and economic solutions. Western governments should develop public goods projects that benefit people of all colors, regions, and class backgrounds, thereby avoiding the toxic perception of ethnic or political favoritism. Reassuring working-class, economically marginalized populations that they, too, can count on the solidarity of their more affluent and competitive fellow citizens might go a long way toward reducing the appeal of resentment-driven, anti-immigrant populism. This should go hand in hand with a new form of inclusive nationalism. In the United States, liberals such as the intellectual historian Mark Lilla and moderate conservatives such as the political scientist Francis Fukuyama have recently suggested how such a national narrative might be constructed: by embracing both majorities and minorities, emphasizing their shared interests rather than pitting white men against a coalition of minorities, as is done today by progressives and populist nationalists alike.

In both the developed and the developing world, nationalism is here to stay. There is currently no other principle on which to base the international state system. (Universalistic cosmopolitanism, for instance, has little purchase outside the philosophy departments of Western universities.) And it is unclear if transnational institutions such as the European Union will ever be able to assume the core functions of national governments, including welfare and defense, which would allow them to gain popular legitimacy.

#### AND the AFF causes great power war AND magnifies violence.

Stephen M. Walt 20, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Countries Should Mind Their Own Business Two cheers for a classic idea that’s been out of fashion for too long: state sovereignty.” Foreign Policy, 07/17/2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/17/sovereignty-exceptionalism-countries-should-mind-their-own-business/

What we are seeing, in short, is a reassertion of sovereign independence on the part of great and small powers alike. The Westphalian model of sovereignty has never been absolute or uncontested, but the idea that individual nations should be (mostly) free to chart their own course at home remains deeply embedded in the present world order. The territorial state remains the basic building block of world politics, and, with some exceptions, states today are doing more to reinforce that idea than to dilute it.

Although there are clearly areas where our future depends on states agreeing to limit their own freedom of action and conform to global norms and institutions, greater respect for sovereignty and national autonomy has some obvious benefits. First, states that interfere in foreign countries rarely understand what they are doing, and even well-intentioned efforts often fail due to ignorance, unintended consequences, or local resentment and resistance. A stronger norm of noninterference could make some protracted conflicts less likely or prolonged.

Second, trying to impose a single model on other countries inevitably raises threat perceptions and increases the risk of serious great-power conflict. The Westphalian idea of sovereignty was created in part to address this problem: Instead of continuing to fight over which version of Christianity would hold sway in different countries (one of the key drivers of the wars that preceded the Westphalian peace), European states agreed to let each ruler determine the religious orientation of their realm. Similarly, a powerful state’s efforts to shape the domestic arrangements of another country will inevitably be seen as threatening by the target: Just look at how Americans now react to the possibility of Russian interference in our political system.

Third, creating a more stable international economic order while preserving most of the benefits of trade and comparative advantage will require fashioning trade and economic arrangements that permit great national autonomy, even at the price of slightly lower global growth rates. Not only might this reduce the risk of global financial panics, but allowing individual states greater freedom to set the terms of their international economic engagement could also reduce the anti-free trade backlash that is currently fueling costly trade wars.

Finally, a world in which a single political and economic model prevails is probably impossible anyway, at least for the foreseeable future. To believe that one size could fit all ignores the enormous diversity that still exists in the world and the powerful tendency for ideas and institutions to morph and evolve as they travel from their point of origins. Take pop music: Elvis Presley creates a new amalgam of rhythm and blues, gospel, and rockabilly (with a jolt of testosterone), his influence arrives in England and helps inspire the Beatles, who lead the “British invasion” of America in the 1960s, which then combines with Bob Dylan and the folk music movement to create the sound of groups like The Byrds. Or look at how Lin-Manuel Miranda combined hip-hop with his deep appreciation of traditional Broadway styles to create something new like Hamilton. These examples just scratch the surface of how music changes when different cultural streams begin to interact; I could just as easily have cited examples from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, or the Silk Road.

Because humans are boundlessly creative social beings who resist conformity, and because no social or political arrangements are ever perfect, dissidents will always arise and contending visions will emerge no matter how fiercely they are repressed. Institutions created in one place may travel to other locations, but they will mutate and evolve in the process and exhibit different forms wherever they take root.

And that’s why I’ll raise two cheers for the (partly) sovereign state. A world made up of contending nationalisms is hardly a utopia, with the ever-present possibility of conflict and war and many obstacles to mutual cooperation. But trying to fit a diverse humanity into a uniform box is doomed to fail—and no small source of trouble as well. Even if we hold certain values to be sacred and are tempted to act when other states violate them, continued respect for boundaries and sovereignty is also a norm that can keep simmering rivalries in check. Libya would not have multiple powers interfering in it today had Britain, France, and the United States not decided to meddle there back in 2011.

As A.J.P. Taylor once archly observed, leaders in the 19th century “fought ‘necessary’ wars and killed thousands; the idealists of the 20th century fought ‘just’ wars and killed millions.” Looking ahead, greater respect for national sovereignty and fewer efforts to force the whole world into one way of living will help emerging rivalries stay within bounds and help countries with very different values cooperate on those critical issues where their interests overlap.

#### Err NEG---your predisposed against nationalism.

Gustavo De Las Casas 09, Doctoral candidate in international relations at Columbia University, "Is Nationalism Good for You?" Foreign Policy, 10/08/2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/08/is-nationalism-good-for-you/.

But this negative publicity confuses what is more often than not an innocuous sentiment. Nationalism is a feeling of unity with a group beyond one’s immediate family and friends. In and of itself, it is not conducive to disastrous wars. The bad rap on nationalism relies almost exclusively on cherry-picked exceptions. These conclusions were drawn without considering the far-more-common cases in which nationalism was not the root of some evil. Moreover, many previous studies on the causes of war lacked one key component: an adequate measure of nationalism. Absent this measure, it is impossible to tell if the brand of nationalism of, say, the Axis powers was more intense than others in the years leading up to 1939. Yet, scholars are quick to blame nationalism for a host of ills.

Why this haste? Part of the reason lies in the scholarly reverence to homo economicus, the cool-headed and self-interested person thought to make optimal decisions at all times. This assumed rational egoist stands in direct opposition to the stereotypical nationalist. After all, the nationalist is often anything but coolheaded. And, being willing to die for his compatriots if need be, he isn’t selfish either. Thus, many scholars conclude, if nationalism does exist, it would only disturb the God-given rationality of humanity, and that meant trouble in politics and economics.

But the deeper roots of antinationalism seem to lie in the value system of scholars. Success in academia is often gauged by how coldly logical one can be. Intense emotional content is frowned upon. So your run-of-the-mill academic, devoted to library stays, will naturally view nationalism as unintelligent and primal. And being so, nationalism could not possibly produce better countries. Or could it?

MY NATION, MYSELF

Modern political science generally holds that nationalism predisposes a nation’s members to see outsiders as potentially inferior and evil. This perception is supposed to make it easier for nationalists to, say, curtail trade with others and even wage war. But there is a problem with this logic. If nothing else, nationalism is a sense of collective unity that turns large groups into extended families. In itself, this says nothing about how one nation should treat another. In everyday life, we usually love and identify with our own family. That certainly does not make us believe that neighboring families pose a threat. The same goes for nationalism. It does not manufacture hatred for others, just concern for one’s fellow citizens. By believing that everyone is in a national endeavor together, citizens value each other’s welfare as well as their own. In other words, nationalism makes people less selfish. Granted, the altruism that nationalism provides is not the cosmopolitan sort that philosophers dream about. Members of a nation may not care about all the people in the world, but they do exhibit a selective altruism in caring about their fellow compatriots. And this selective altruism, when shared by all citizens, makes for a better country than one populated by purely selfish individuals.

### Case---Sustainability---1NC

#### Nation-state paradigm is broadly resilient---empirics verify fears are flawed.

Mark Copelovitch et al. 20, Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin – Madison; Sara B. Hobolt, Professor and the Sutherland Chair in European Institutions at the Department of Government at the London School of Economics; Stefanie Walter, Professor for international relations and political economy at the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich, "Challenges to the contemporary global order. Cause for pessimism or optimism?" Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 27, Issue 7, 2020, T&F.

In this last contribution to the debate section, we assess whether we may be witnessing an existential challenge to the contemporary global order, and whether we have grounds to be optimistic or pessimistic about its future. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann (this issue) argued in this debate section that although the contemporary challenges to the global order to date do not systematically violate its foundational principles, it also notes that these transformations within the global order may over time turn into a crisis of the order itself. Our contribution therefore focuses on the persistence and robustness of the contemporary global order by examining the potential ‘breaking points’ at which transformations within the order would turn into a fundamental crisis of the global order itself. By examining ongoing developments, we consider the likelihood such a breaking point will be reached in the near future for each of the three foundational principles of the contemporary order identified by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann: an international and state-led global order, economic liberalism, and inclusive, rule-based multilateralism. Based on their discussion about what would constitute a crisis of the global order, Table 1 lists our criteria for what kind of developments we see as a systematic violation of each of the three foundational principles that would indicate a breaking point at which the future of the contemporary global order is seriously threatened.

[Table omitted]

In the remainder of this paper, we evaluate recent developments against these benchmarks. Although our analysis is necessarily brief, we conclude that there are reasons for both optimism and pessimism. Overall, and in line with Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann’s conclusions, we find that, the principles of the contemporary order remain widely upheld to date. However, whereas the first two foundational principles are currently not at risk (the state-centric nature of the system) or still far away (economic liberalism) of being systematically violated, the third foundational principle of the order (inclusive, rule-based multilateralism) faces higher risks of systematic violation in the future.

International and state-led order

With respect to the first principle of the liberal order – its international and state-led focus – we remain broadly optimistic. To date, and as discussed in more detail by Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann, there is no serious challenge to the dominant role of states or the principle of national sovereignty in sight, either in terms of the disintegration or collapse of any large or powerful states in the international system, or in terms of the probability of supranational (world) government emerging anytime in the foreseeable future. This does not mean, of course, that states face no challenges to their policy autonomy or sovereignty in the global economy and international system. Nor does it mean that non-governmental and non-state actors are unimportant. Indeed, multinational corporations, NGOs, and other private actors play increasingly important roles – for better and for worse – in international relations. One could imagine these increasingly prominent roles generating crisis if they tilt the balance of power in ways that seriously restrict or undermine the power of national governments to provide for their own citizens. For example, concerns about tax evasion and rising inequality raise questions about the ability of national governments to address the economic and political challenges of globalization, especially as evidence accumulates that the benefits of globalization have increasingly accrued to a handful of superstar firms and to specific geographies within rich countries. Nonetheless, it seems premature at best, in 2019, to forecast the end of the nation-state as a key ordering principle of the existing global order.

Economic liberalism

With respect to the second core principle of the liberal order – economic liberalism – there are certainly more grounds for pessimism. Trade and cross-border investment flows have stagnated in the last decade, and the surge in protectionism since 2017 – illustrated most clearly in the US–China ‘trade war’ and the Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs on the goods of a broad set of key US trading partners – marks a clear break from the long-term trend toward greater liberalization under the GATT/WTO system since the 1950s and the thickening web of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) since the 1990s. By the end of 2019, the world’s most successful international arbitration mechanism designed to resolve trade conflicts, the WTO’s dispute settlement court, might cease to function because the Trump administration is blocking new judicial appointments on the Appellate Body (Creamer 2019). Two of the erstwhile champions of economic liberalism (the US and UK) are now the two main major powers dragging their feet with respect to globalization and institutionalized economic cooperation. Finally, while China’s deepening trade and financial ties to countries in Africa and Asia – through foreign aid, direct investment, and the Belt and Road Initiative – are evidence of the continued deepening of globalization, it is unclear whether these ties support or pose a challenge to the endurance of economic liberalism (as well as political liberalism).

Yet, in spite of this recent backlash against the principle of economic liberalism, there are good reasons to remain optimistic that the economic foundations of the liberal order remain solid, both because levels of economic globalization are not significantly declining and because we have not yet observed a systematic and across-the-board increase in protectionism. With regard to the first criterion, there is currently no evidence of a collapse or rollback of international trade and finance, despite recent stagnation and some worrying parallels to the 1930s, when a wave of protectionism, capital controls, and competitive exchange rate devaluations triggered the total collapse of the global economy (Kindleberger 1973). The global economy has, of course, endured sustained threats and challenges in the last decade. Since the Great Recession, the growth of international trade has slowed down and global financial flows 1 have sunk to and stagnated at levels below those of 2007 (see Figure 1(a and b)). However, these levels are still exponentially higher than in the 1980s. In contrast to the interwar era, however, the global economy did not buckle or collapse as many policymakers feared and pundits predicted. Rather, it has endured and persisted in the wake of the Great Recession and the turbulent years of the last decade. Given this experience, the most salient feature of globalization in the twenty-first century may well be its resilience.

[Chart omitted]

Of course, new challenges have emerged, but their ultimate effect remains an open question. The US trade war with China has the potential to seriously disrupt existing trade flows, but it may ultimately not lead to an overall decline in trade. Rather, the trade war’s primary effect may be a reorientation of existing trade relations through the economic decoupling of the United States and China, the world’s two largest economies (Bown and Irwin 2019). Moreover, the changing nature of international trade relations – through the consolidation of market power, increasing product differentiation, and the development of complex global supply chains – are likely to make the high degree of international integration more persistent, even as they also lead to changes by empowering business interests (Johns et al. 2019).

There is also no systematic and across-the-board increase in protectionism. Although the Trump administration’s trade war dominates headlines, the reality is that retaliation by the world’s other leading economies has been quite measured, and these countries have not engaged in increased protectionism with each other. Indeed, even China – as it raises tariffs on US goods in retaliation – has lowered its average tariffs on the rest of the world in 2018 (from 8% to 6.7%). 2 The embrace of mercantilism has thus been predominantly a US phenomenon. Because the US has always been one of the contemporary global order’s main champions, this understandably generates considerable concern. At the same time, however, most other governments have not joined the US in becoming significantly more protectionist. Several new trade agreements among the world’s other most powerful countries and economic blocs have been negotiated in recent years (CP/TPP, EU-Japan, EU–Canada, EU-MERCOSUR). Furthermore, a large majority of the public across the world still believes that trade is generally good for their country (Stokes 2018). What is certainly clear is that free trade has become more contested, both for economic reasons (especially in the US, see for example Bisbee et al. this issue) and because of concerns about environmental issues as well as health, labour and consumer protection standards (Nguyen and Spilker 2019). Moreover, ratification of new trade agreements sometimes presents a significant challenge. It is also clear that migration continues to be contested and far from liberalized (Goodman and Schimmelfennig this issue). However, as Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann (this issue) point out, the free movement of people has never been part of the economic liberalism principle of the contemporary global order.

In sum, this discussion suggests that the backlash against economic liberalism is real, but it also highlights how there has been no systematic and across-the-board increase in protectionism, with the exception of the US (and to a lesser extent the UK). This turn inward by the erstwhile champions of economic liberalism clearly poses challenges to the global order. But it does not represent a wholesale rejection of this foundational principle of the contemporary global order.

Inclusive, rule-based multilateralism

Thus, on balance, we remain optimistic that the two core foundational principles of the liberal order endure despite recent challenges. It is with respect to the third, procedural principle – inclusive, rule-based multilateralism – where we see the greatest challenges and the most serious grounds for pessimism. It is here that ongoing developments raise concerns about systematic violations of the principle in line with the criteria laid out in Table 1: the disintegration of existing international institutions without replacement and the replacement of multilateralism as the dominant procedural principle by unilateralism and bilateralism.

Regarding the disintegration of existing international institutions without replacement, the most concerning development is that unilateral disintegration challenges to inclusive multilateralism have become more prevalent. These come in a variety of forms, but all have in common that individual countries try to disengage from the international commitments they have made in multilateral (and sometimes bilateral) agreements. The most visible form of these challenges is unilateral withdrawal from international institutions. Such withdrawals are rare but not new (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019). However, the recent wave of unilateral withdrawals, such as Brexit or the increasing number of withdrawals from the International Criminal Court (ICC), have been more consequential than in the past. At times, such as in the case of US withdrawals from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) or the INF nuclear treaty, withdrawals have threatened or doomed the entire institution. International institutions regularly cease to function or are dissolved (e.g., Gray 2018; Leeds and Savun 2007): Between 1815 and 2005, 39% of IOs have ceased to exist (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018). So this itself does not constitute a violation of the principle of inclusive, rule-based multilateralism. However, past decisions to dissolve an institution have usually been taken in a consensual manner by all member states, and the functions of a dissolved or dysfunctional institution have often been taken up by new international institutions (Crasnic and Palmtag 2019). In contrast, withdrawals in recent years have been increasingly unilateral and politicized, making it harder for governments to compromise. This, in turn, has made withdrawals more disruptive.

Two additional disintegration challenges do not aim at exit from or the dissolution of international institutions, but nonetheless threaten the contemporary global order’s principle of inclusive, rule-based multilateralism. The first challenge is unilateral attempts to renegotiate existing international agreements in one country’s favour. International cooperation is typically established because both sides benefit from such cooperation, even if the gains of cooperation are not always shared equally. While most treaty renegotiations tend to benefit both partners (Castle 2019), member states increasingly try to change the balance of costs and benefits of cooperation in their favour. Again, this challenge is not entirely new, but the existing evidence suggests that they have become more frequent (Nowrot 2016), even if the success of countries to secure concessions varies considerably. Whereas the US was able to successfully renegotiate the US-Korea free trade agreement and NAFTA, recent Swiss and Greek attempts to renegotiate their relationship with the EU and the Eurozone, respectively, were met with significant resistance and did not lead to any significant changes (Walter et al. 2018).

Another challenge is non-compliance with institutions’ core norms. Once again, non-compliance with international agreements is nothing new. But non-compliance can turn into a serious challenge to the rule-based order when it threatens the core norms or pillars of an international institution – especially when it takes the form of explicit, overt attacks. Such serious non-compliance has proliferated in recent years, as in the case of President Trump’s decision to block the reappointment of WTO judges or political reforms in Hungary and Poland that undermine key pillars of democracy and the rule of law, which are core EU norms (Kelemen 2017). Unilateral refusals to comply with core norms of international institutions are dangerous, because they can fundamentally undermine both the specific institution in question and the broader principle of inclusive, rule-based multilateralism at the heart of the contemporary global order. 3 This is especially the case when the remaining member states lack the ability to sanction such non-compliance and to incentivize the non-complying government to change course.

These disintegration dynamics are problematic because they reduce the share of the cooperative gains other member states can enjoy. This lowers the attractiveness of international institutions for the remaining member states, which raises the risks that additional countries will no longer be willing to pay the price of membership, let alone create new institutions to solve pressing transnational problems (see the discussion of the migration problem in Goodman and Schimmelfennig this issue). A second, related risk is political contagion. The historical record shows that when powerful states withdraw from IOs, smaller countries tend to follow suit (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019). Moreover, a breakdown of cooperation in one institution or issue may fuel further distrust and resentment among states in other institutions or issues. This can also be observed in the current EU-UK relations, as well as in US President Trump’s claims that the other states are ‘taking advantage of the US’ in the current system. Multilateral, rule-based cooperation is much harder to achieve in such a context of distrust and resentment than in a context of trust and goodwill.

A particularly worrying development is that disintegration challenges now confront many different component institutions of the liberal order at the same time: the ICC, UNESCO, the Paris Climate accord, and even NATO are battling actual unilateral withdrawals or threats of withdrawal. The US is trying to renegotiate existing trade agreements in its favour, and institutions such as the WTO, the European Human Rights Convention, and the ICC are faced with member states that are defying some of its core norms (Voeten 2019). The EU faces all three disintegration challenges at the same time: unilateral withdrawal of the UK, Switzerland’s attempts to renegotiate its bilateral relations with the EU, and non-compliance with core norms from Hungary, Poland, and more recently even Italy 4 . The fact that so many disintegration challenges to inclusive, rule-based multilateralism are occurring in so many places and institutions at the same time, in many different forms, and with increasing frequency threaten the bedrock procedural principle of the existing global order – rule-based multilateralism.

There is also cause for concern regarding the second criterion: that unilateralism and bilateralism replace multilateralism as the dominant procedural principle. Here we are seeing some movement in the direction of unilateralism and bilateralism, especially in the realm of public opinion. Whereas disintegration challenges in the past have typically originated among the foreign policy elites and governments of individual member states, they are now increasingly rooted in member states’ mass publics (Bisbee et al. this issue; Walter 2019). Across the world, the number of people viewing international organizations positively has declined over the past 20 years (Bearce and Joliff Scott 2019). In Europe, Euroscepticism has become a widespread phenomenon that is no longer limited to the fringes of the political spectrum (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Candidates and political parties with cooperation-sceptic and nationalist programmes, such as Bolsonaro in Brazil, Trump in the US, or the Lega in Italy, have seen resounding electoral successes. And popular referendums have proliferated whose outcomes provide national policymakers with a strong popular mandate to pursue withdrawal, renegotiation, non-compliance, as well as resistance to new or deeper international cooperation (Hobolt 2009; Walter et al. 2018). Since 2010, voters have voted down proposals for more or continued international cooperation in the majority of referendums (De Vries et al. 2019). Such voter-based disintegration is particularly challenging for international institutions because these instances tend to be much more politicized and salient in the political debate both at home and abroad than disintegration decisions taken by a small foreign policy elite, which limits the room for compromise at the international level.

However, there are also some silver linings: First, these challenges have brought the benefits of the contemporary global order into clearer focus and have rallied supporters of embattled international institutions. For example, public support for the EU increased after the Brexit referendum (De Vries 2017) and after the 2016 US presidential elections (Minkus et al. 2019). Moreover, governments worldwide have been stepping up efforts at creating or maintaining multilateral agreements without US participation – examples are the CP/TPP treaty that replaced the originally negotiated TPP treaty after the US’s withdrawal in 2017, or the EU-Japan trade agreement. 5

Second, there are reasons for cautious optimism about the durability of rule-based multilateralism. State withdrawals from IOs and IO dissolutions remain rare events that are dwarfed by new IO accessions and the establishment of new IOs (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019; Crasnic and Palmtag 2019). Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann (this issue) point to an empirical trend of increased multilateral cooperation and regionalism, a trend that is exemplified by the EU. Through all the trials and crises of the last decade, the Euro has survived, Brexit has not had any significant contagion effect so far, and a vast majority of Europeans still supports the European project. Indeed, it can be argued that the history of the EU is one of ‘integration-through-crisis’ (Scicluna 2019) or ‘failing forward’ (Jones et al. 2016: 2012). Certainly, as others have noted, ‘integration through crisis’ raises concerns about legitimacy and accountability in European integration (Börzel and Risse 2018; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kreuder-Sonnen 2018). Nonetheless, the durability of European integration and popular support for it highlight the staying power of rule-based multilateralism despite serious challenges to the global order. Other major international institutions such as the IMF and (so far) NATO have displayed similar resilience. 6 And although scepticism about international organizations has increased worldwide, only about one in five people worldwide think that international organizations are taking away too much power from their national governments (Bearce and Joliff Scott 2019: Table 1).

Taken together, we conclude that the procedural principle of inclusive, rule-based multilateralism faces significant and increasing challenges which may, over time, result in a serious and systematic violation of this third foundational principle of the global order. Yet, such a development is not a foregone conclusion, and we also see some more encouraging developments.

Conclusion

Ultimately, we arrive at a cautiously optimistic assessment regarding the endurance of the core substantive principles of the contemporary global order – state-centrism and economic liberalism – and more serious concern about the challenges to the core procedural principle of rule-based multilateralism. Based on these concerns, we conclude that there are considerable reasons to worry about the future of the global order.

And yet, history also suggests that this order has proven robust time and again in the face of serious challenges. Indeed, the global order and its core principles have, in many ways, been in a state of permanent crisis throughout the post-war era, and the order has been successful in changing and adapting from within. In every decade since the 1950s, we have seen a series of major institutional failures (e.g., the IMF’s failure to perform its initial task of managing fixed exchange rates; the UN’s periodic and repeated failure to manage collective security problems), ad hoc fixes (e.g., the Marshall Plan or NATO’s Balkan intervention), partial collapses (such as the end of the Bretton Woods gold-dollar monetary system in 1971–73), the repurposing of institutions for new missions (e.g., the IMF’s rebirth as global crisis lender starting in the 1980s), and long periods where key institutions have fallen dormant (e.g., the stagnation of WTO negotiations for the last 18 years) or stumbled along in secular decline (e.g., the World Bank today vis-à-vis other foreign aid providers). The contemporary global order has never operated fully as intended, or absent bias, power politics, and the seemingly existential threat of isolationist domestic politics in the US. And yet, nevertheless, it has persisted and the founding principles of the global order have endured.

### Case---AT: Endless War Impact---1NC

#### Nation-states pacify the world and prevent imperial interventions.

Sebastiaan L. Metselaar 18, Master’s candidate in International Cooperation, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, “A study on how modern nationalism can prevent imperialism from re-emerging,” http://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/141693/1/000000151525.pdf

The nation currently has its limitations. To break down this limitation aspect, we can take any nation for our example as all of them, even the ones encompassing millions or even over a billion people has to deal with finite or to some extend elastic boundaries. Beyond these boundaries lie other nations. These boundaries represent the well-developed understanding in international relations on a nation’s legal property rights. These inviolable rights were absent prior to the establishment of the nation and were only to be acknowledged worldwide by the international community starting from the decolonization period, marking modern nationalism. Now that basically all land is claimed by a nation and that globalization has led to a world market where goods, services, and (human) resources can be exchanged with ease, it has drastically reduced the attractiveness of pull factors. Plus, no nation imagines itself as one with mankind, not a single nationalist dreams of a day where all human beings will join their nation as for say Christians dream of a wholly Christian planet.

Before the French Revolution started, both push and pull factors were present that would attract a tribe, kingdom, or empire to conquer territory without being held accountable for their actions. The development of the nation and the industrialization, created a larger gap between the developed areas and undeveloped areas (i.e. Europe and basically the rest of the world). Imperialism was a logical consequence as a distinction between nations, those who have nationalism, and non-nations, areas that do not have nationalism, became clear. No nationalism meant that no nation had claimed property rights over a certain territory. Thus, prior to the decolonization period and the development of the international system, there were no resisting forces that strong ever in the history of humankind that could oppose imperialism. Important for the understanding of these distinctions, it has to be emphasized that the world is divided per area and that each area was in a different stage of development. When in Europe the nations started to form, in other parts of the world the areas would be controlled by tribes, kingdoms, or empires. In the past, the West became more advanced than we could have seen for example in Asia in the 18th century. Even in present day the West takes the lead in technological, military, and economic development, despite Asia is catching up in some cases or even went beyond the level of certain Western developments. Africa however is still lacking behind and there will most probably be never a point in time where all areas in the world reach the same level of development.

If indeed the process of nation building follows similar paths as it did in Europe, then Africa could be in the phase of enlightenment as efforts are being made to modernize and to search for a solid national identity. As mentioned earlier, most developing countries are weak states. The Hutu’s and Tutsi’s were enforced to live within borders they have not chosen themselves but were enforced with by the end of the colonial period. On a world map, the boundaries of the nations are clear, but it does not show the nationalness of the citizens within those boundaries. It is a painful inheritance of the colonial era. By for example establishing a common language and modernizing education like the Europeans did during the transition from dynasticism to nationalism and imperialism, it will help to strengthen the imagined community that is the nation, further decreasing the pull factors.

Obvious mistakes have been made throughout the decolonization period that are still having disastrous consequences today. Also nations like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon had their borders drawn in the sand by England and France without them taking into account how local history, religion, geography, and economy had influenced the citizens. The people would not identify themselves with one another, they were descendants from the Abbasid Caliphate or the Babylonian or Ottoman Empire, all who had different cultures. Nonetheless, these nations were (forcefully or without much effort) created, and the problems for creating them created the many civil wars we see in the Middle East today. Nevertheless, these newly established nations had claimed full sovereignty and independence over their distinct territory, that any attempt of conquering would be illegal and costly as witnessed with IS and the Kurds, even here a re-emergence of imperialism will be prevented.

The imagined community feature was most important for the understanding of the roots of nationalism as it contains the element of belonging to something bigger than the individual. Explaining that it is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community (Anderson 2006). It is the limitation and sovereignty aspect of nationalism that marked these new nations’ their property rights (disappearing of pull factors).

Though we do live in the most peaceful era of our time, we tend to forget how much more violent the world has used to be. These days, more people die of car crashes than being killed by wars or terrorism. We commemorate the wars and celebrate our independence, to continue the realization of what happened and to what extend we are capable of committing inhumane crimes. Whether internal state conflicts have been decreased since the end of World War II is debatable, but that clashes between states have decreased is undeniable. The succession of the League of Nations by the United Nations, provides one of the most powerful resistance to pull factors in keeping nations in check with regards to imperial ambitions. Obviously there were tensions during for example the Cold War and conflicts did break out between states, but in light of the historic time frame, it has never been this peaceful as it is today. No Roman or Ottoman empire can start a conquest, in fact, ever since the end of the last great war no country recognized by the United Nations has been conquered or wiped off the map. Even the superpowers today who have all the means for starting their imperial conquest have to take into account that such conquest are too costly to undertake (e.g. Russia and Crimea, China and Tibet). And despite that conflicts are still present; the United Nations does not only have the tools to interfere military wise (i.e. peacekeeping operations), but also the capabilities to sanction perpetrators. The United Nations might be far from perfect as power struggles within the system exist, causing nations among each other to differentiate in meaning and action. However, as long as it is in place, nations will rethink once more their behavior.

Thus, no country has attempted to conquer another nation ever since the end of the decolonization period. The rise of the nation has a causal relationship to the decline in interstate violence. Moreover, the nationalists in a country do not want to start an imperial conquest and make colonies, instead, they want the colonials out of their country. The nationstate as we know it today is deeper rooted in the emotions of the masses than any other previous political organization has achieved before. In order for nationalism to develop and for sovereignty to be claimed by the populace, a complete revision of the status quo was required.

As for Korea, the foundation of nationalism developed during the annexation by Japan and it was not strong enough to prevent the separation between the North and South. These days, South-Korea has probably one of the strongest forms of nationalism. The love for the flag and the (popular) culture, the remembrance of its past, all contribute to strong sense of horizontal connection. The best and most recent display of Korea’s nationalism were the regular massive protests, by the millions, opposed to the Korean president. The fear of the Korean people in the survey stated in the introduction are therefore overrated.

Not only have the costs of imperial warfare gone up, its profits also declined. Looking into the history of empires, the mere reason for expanding was to search for resources that could still the economic hunger for growth. Thus, most conquests were focusing on securing material wealth such as gold, silver, spices, cattle, but also slaves. These days, we all have access to a global market and as our traditional resources are getting exhausted, there is a shift in focus to for example renewable energy sources. So, not only war did war became less profitable, peace became more lucrative than ever.

## 2NC

### T USFG---2NC

#### Resolved means enact policy

**Words and Phrases 1964** Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon—the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters

**Webster’s** Guide to Grammar and Writing **2k**

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go one…**If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief** and **the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence**, beginning the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### Disagreement requires agreement---1AC agrees that Clash is good!

Jay 1AC Blumler and Stephen Coleman 21. Jay Blumler is Emeritus Professor of Public Communication at the University of Leeds and Emeritus Professor of Journalism at the University of Maryland. Stephen Coleman (corresponding author) is Professor of Political Communication at the University of Leeds. “After the Crisis, A “New Normal” for Democratic Citizenship?” Javnost - The Public, 28:1, 3-19, DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2021.1883884

The lesson we draw from these studies is that crises do not generate changes in norms and practices deterministically through some sort of metaphysical shock wave. Normative and practical changes are consequences of altered perceptions of meaning. Crises throw social meaning into disarray, fracturing seemingly settled accounts of who “we” are; whose social contributions are most important; how to speak about causes and effects; feasible scales of social coordination; what can and cannot be tolerated; and how to demonstrate accountability. In crises, contestations of meaning become more explicit. Claims that certain perspectives are beyond the pale have less clout. Ideas that had an incipient, but marginal presence in pre-crisis thinking might begin to be taken seriously. A mixture of nervous conjecture and confident extemporisation inflect the public conversation, undermining abiding certainties.

Faced with a historically exceptional combination of global pandemic and economic depression, some citizens and politicians reach for a new language of civic reflection. This is because any hope of tackling the unprecedented debt pressures, market failures, infrastructural collapse, population immobility, intensifying inequalities and collective trauma generated by the crisis will not only call for imaginative, coordinated and massively resourced policy responses, but a new way of talking about policy that is not weighed down by obsolete categories. In short, much depends upon whether people can find a common frame of reflection that will enable them to think, speak and act upon what binds them together as well as what divides them.

Politics arises when people disagree, and now that there are more and bigger problems than ever to disagree about it is vitally important to find ways of arguing that do not exacerbate uncertainty or intolerance. In any political disagreement there are two matters at stake: firstly, the nature of the dispute; secondly, the competing options for action. The second cannot be realised unless there is some clarity surrounding the first. The political theorist, William Connolly (1993, 2) suggests that the distinction between these tasks can be compared to the conventionally agreed meanings set out for juries before they deliberate on a legal case:

The jury examines the evidence and reaches a verdict but prior to its deliberations, the judge, acting as the official interpreter of the law, charges the jury with a set of responsibilities, establishes what can be considered as evidence, and specifies what constitutes a punishable offense … In charging the jury and in regulating the presentation of evidence to it, the judge, we might say, specifies the terms within which the jury considers evidence and reaches a verdict.

Of course, democratic public debate does not take place in a courtroom in which the rules of discourse can be laid down by an authoritative judge. The contestability of the terms of political discourse by the people themselves is a fundamental precondition of democracy. People must not only be able to have their say, but to determine what they are talking about; what matters and what things mean. This entails a capacity to argue about the very norms that underpin policy decisions and to communicate across differences, acknowledging normative disagreements as necessary features of political communication. It is to these matters of normative contestation that we refer when we suggest that “the new normal” depends upon finding a refreshed language of democratic citizenship. What form might this discursive reconfiguration take? How might it be incorporated into an emerging vernacular of civic discourse?

Re-Thinking the Space, Mediation and Contestation of Citizenship

Citizenship involves the performance of norms and practices through which people are bound to strangers within communities of co-existence. The traditional liberal conception of citizenship sees it as a relationship between individuals and the state entailing the exercise of duties and rights. Citizenship in this sense is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a polity. Anyone who possesses this status is equal, having all the rights and duties that come with legally sanctioned legitimacy. No universal principle determines what those rights and duties shall be, but over time societies tend to create images of the ideal citizen and direct individuals to aspire to them (Marshall 1964).

In contrast to this legalistic notion of citizenship, there is a broader, less state-bound characterisation which sees it as comprising a repertoire of practices that people inherit and devise in order to co-exist interdependently with others. In this broader sense, to act as a citizen is to engage in public situations of various kinds with people one might not know and who might not share one’s interests, tastes, values, or even language. Sometimes civic interactions will involve relations with governments, authorities, or employers. At other times they will relate to quotidian ways of living amongst neighbours and strangers. Performances of citizenship are both framed institutionally, conforming to conventional notions of political and civic participation (voting, joining parties and campaigns, following the news) and improvised from below, often transcending or resisting established civic scripts. Through such extemporised forms of social practice, citizens create what Arendt (1958, 198) refers to as “spaces of appearance”: “the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men (sic) exist not merely like other living or inanimate things, but make their appearance explicitly.”

The crisis induced by the pandemic raises fundamental questions about how citizens are to “make their appearance explicitly.” Most of the decisions and regulations responding to the crisis have been framed by political elites and legitimised by appeals to expert wisdom. Public involvement in shaping or making such decisions has been extremely limited, raising questions about the role of democratic publics in responding to critical issues that affect them. Moves to democratise crisis response are bound to consider fundamental questions about who constitutes “the public” (given the need to respond to social challenges that transcend political borders); how civic discourse is mediated (given the need to generate global narratives, conversations and concerted actions in the face of common threats) and how political differences can be both recognised and negotiated (given the urgent need for pluralistic publics to work through complex problems). It is to these questions that we now turn.

Constituting the Public Domain

The global pandemic has brought into sharp focus the spatial framing of political problems within national boundaries. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, politics has been conceived as “taking place” within national units characterised by territorial borders, sovereign authority, civically attached populations and bounded economic interests. The emergence of nation-states as a natural scale of political action and analysis is the defining feature of the Westphalian order in which to govern is to protect and enhance national state interests; to be a citizen is to belong to a nation state, thereby bound by specific geo-political responsibilities and rights; and to speak of democracy in an empirically meaningful sense is to refer to a mode of legitimacy operating at the nation-state level. The Westphalian view of political place established a firm distinction between domestic and foreign domains; inside and outside; the scope of national control and extraneous precariousness.

The robustness of these conceptual categories of inter-national social order have been called into question by the speed and density of global economic and cultural interconnections that have become increasingly manifest since the late twentieth century. The conception of the globally dominant capitalist market as a “world system” was elaborated in the mid-1970s by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 390) who urged social scientists to abandon the reification of the nation-state as the primary unit of politico-economic analysis. He argued that capitalism could only operate as a world economy “with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems.” In short, states might be distinguished by cultural characteristics and domestic political projects, but they cannot escape their enmeshment in a global system of interdependent economic relations. Some theorists have celebrated globalisation as a modernising force, while others have warned against its homogenising flattening of cultures. Rejecting the simplistic notion of globalisation as “a single society and culture occupying the planet” (Waters 1995), more nuanced theorists have observed that the contemporary world is characterised by a marked tension between the specificity of place and the overriding dynamics of a global system. The latter frequently overrides the particularities of national statehood, economy and culture, while state actors do what they can to assert their independence. It makes sense to think of there being “multiple, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory globalisms” (Tsing 2000, 342), with states reshaping their territorial claims “on to both sub- and supra-national geographical scales” (Brenner 1999, 65). Such framing and reframing of political space depend as much upon symbolic mediation as upon the rules, treaties and logics of transnational institutions. In short, globalisation entails an ongoing struggle to tell people where and to what they belong.

The Covid-19 health crisis is a primary example of this battle to frame a global event. Most people acknowledge that the pandemic is truly global, albeit disparately pernicious in different parts of the world, and at different times. In relation to the urgent need for global coordination to find a vaccine, the insular ambitions of nations or regions seem manifestly petty and irrelevant. However, that has not stopped nationalist leaders from playing blame games in which they ascribe the origin of the virus to nefarious foreign states, or from making boastful claims that their public health strategy is “world-beating” rather than simply functional. Rarely has the disconnect between bombastic national rhetoric and empirical global reality seemed more conspicuous.

Given that the most pressing and intractable contemporary challenges can only be addressed through global coordination, the challenge of finding effective ways of communicating and acting beyond national silos seems more urgent than ever. From the spread of viruses to regulation of the environment, and from the direction of migration flows to the looming catastrophe of climate change, nation-states appear to be Canute-like before the irresistible waves of globalism. Left to themselves, nations squabble about who should take responsibility, constantly deferring meaningful action until others have made a move.

The inescapably global nature of the pandemic has shown the futility and risk of such an approach, casting doubt upon the pursuit of national solutions and pointing towards the urgency of appeals to transnational public agency. Faced with globally diffuse problems of viral contagion, climate change and market instability, the civic case for stretching the use and meaning of the term “we, the public” becomes compelling. This important shift in collective self-consciousness entails the adoption of what Nancy Fraser (2007, 21) refers to as “the all-affected principle”:

Today, … the idea that citizenship can serve as a proxy for affectedness is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, one’s conditions of living do not depend wholly on the internal constitution of the political community of which one is a citizen. Although the latter remains undeniably relevant, its effects are mediated by other structures, both extra and non-territorial, whose impact is at least as significant … In general, globalization is driving a widening wedge between affectedness and political membership. As those two notions increasingly diverge, the effect is to reveal the former as an inadequate surrogate for the latter.

It follows from Fraser’s analysis that “what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not shared citizenship, but their co-imbrication in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives” (ibid, 22). The logic of the all-affected principle rejects the notion that only national publics can confer democratic legitimacy, as the latter depends upon registering the voices of all those who are potentially affected by a problem, notwithstanding their national labels. This amounts to a post-Westphalian conception of citizenship in which, rather than being fragmented by artificial political divisions, the public is characterised by its common vulnerabilities, experiences and capacities. Members of post-Westphalian publics will continue to disagree with one another, of course, but the public sphere within which such political disagreement takes place will correspond to the dimensions of the issues at stake.

To be clear, it is only through the emergence of a cosmopolitan public domain in which solidarities are rooted in common affectedness rather than national-legal identities that global challenges such as the pandemic and economic depression, as well as climate change and other environmental threats, can be tackled democratically. This does not amount to a utopian call for citizens to adopt an abstractly cosmopolitan stance. Already competing with discourses of nationalism and populism in contemporary societies are many millions of voices across the world who view social problems from the perspective of a universal humanity sharing a common home. Such people are more inclined “to take risks by virtue of encountering the ‘other’” and to possess “some ability to reflect upon and judge aesthetically between different natures, places and societies” (Szerszynskiand and Urry 2002, 470). By understanding that “[g]lobalisation has brought large swathes of the world’s population closer together” in overlapping communities of fate (Held 2003, 478), many contemporary campaigners for social justice frame their arguments in terms of a language of cosmopolitan sensibility. These include movements opposing the structural inequalities of transnational economic power (such as Occupy Wall Street), ecological depredation (the School Strike for Climate Change), institutional sexism (MeToo) and racism (Black Lives Matter). The effectiveness of these campaigns in bringing injustices to global attention does not entail abandoning national institutions and populations as if they no longer matter, but framing messages to affected citizens within a cosmopolitan context that celebrates openness to global heterogeneity, pluralism and nuance.

As the pandemic highlights the limitations of the Westphalian conception of “normal” by forcing people from across the world to face up to their interdependence, both in terms of the transnational porosity of contagion and the resources needed to contain it, it calls attention to the aptness of a “new normal” in which shared social problems are addressed on a new scale. This adjustment of scale calls into being new conceptions of the public, defined increasingly in terms of shared affectedness.

Given that the most urgent crisis facing the world in the aftermath of the pandemic will be the threat of global catastrophe caused by climate change, the world is increasingly dependent upon the practical effectiveness of calls to action that are couched in a language of citizenship that transcends state borders and prioritises shared affectedness. The challenge of co-ordinating moral and political responses with a view to enhancing the public’s global agency is now a prerequisite for even modest success of efforts to save the planet from systemically wrought depredation. Could the public that has begun to develop a consciousness of its collective global vulnerability during the pandemic act upon such awareness beyond the current crisis?

#### That solves

Jay 1AC Blumler and Stephen Coleman 21. Jay Blumler is Emeritus Professor of Public Communication at the University of Leeds and Emeritus Professor of Journalism at the University of Maryland. Stephen Coleman (corresponding author) is Professor of Political Communication at the University of Leeds. “After the Crisis, A “New Normal” for Democratic Citizenship?” Javnost - The Public, 28:1, 3-19, DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2021.1883884

The lesson we draw from these studies is that crises do not generate changes in norms and practices deterministically through some sort of metaphysical shock wave. Normative and practical changes are consequences of altered perceptions of meaning. Crises throw social meaning into disarray, fracturing seemingly settled accounts of who “we” are; whose social contributions are most important; how to speak about causes and effects; feasible scales of social coordination; what can and cannot be tolerated; and how to demonstrate accountability. In crises, contestations of meaning become more explicit. Claims that certain perspectives are beyond the pale have less clout. Ideas that had an incipient, but marginal presence in pre-crisis thinking might begin to be taken seriously. A mixture of nervous conjecture and confident extemporisation inflect the public conversation, undermining abiding certainties. Faced with a historically exceptional combination of global pandemic and economic depression, some citizens and politicians reach for a new language of civic reflection. This is because any hope of tackling the unprecedented debt pressures, market failures, infrastructural collapse, population immobility, intensifying inequalities and collective trauma generated by the crisis will not only call for imaginative, coordinated and massively resourced policy responses, but a new way of talking about policy that is not weighed down by obsolete categories. In short, much depends upon whether people can find a common frame of reflection that will enable them to think, speak and act upon what binds them together as well as what divides them. Politics arises when people disagree, and now that there are more and bigger problems than ever to disagree about it is vitally important to find ways of arguing that do not exacerbate uncertainty or intolerance. In any political disagreement there are two matters at stake: firstly, the nature of the dispute; secondly, the competing options for action. The second cannot be realised unless there is some clarity surrounding the first. The political theorist, William Connolly (1993, 2) suggests that the distinction between these tasks can be compared to the conventionally agreed meanings set out for juries before they deliberate on a legal case: The jury examines the evidence and reaches a verdict but prior to its deliberations, the judge, acting as the official interpreter of the law, charges the jury with a set of responsibilities, establishes what can be considered as evidence, and specifies what constitutes a punishable offense … In charging the jury and in regulating the presentation of evidence to it, the judge, we might say, specifies the terms within which the jury considers evidence and reaches a verdict. Of course, democratic public debate does not take place in a courtroom in which the rules of discourse can be laid down by an authoritative judge. The contestability of the terms of political discourse by the people themselves is a fundamental precondition of democracy. People must not only be able to have their say, but to determine what they are talking about; what matters and what things mean. This entails a capacity to argue about the very norms that underpin policy decisions and to communicate across differences, acknowledging normative disagreements as necessary features of political communication. It is to these matters of normative contestation that we refer when we suggest that “the new normal” depends upon finding a refreshed language of democratic citizenship. What form might this discursive reconfiguration take? How might it be incorporated into an emerging vernacular of civic discourse? Re-Thinking the Space, Mediation and Contestation of Citizenship Citizenship involves the performance of norms and practices through which people are bound to strangers within communities of co-existence. The traditional liberal conception of citizenship sees it as a relationship between individuals and the state entailing the exercise of duties and rights. Citizenship in this sense is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a polity. Anyone who possesses this status is equal, having all the rights and duties that come with legally sanctioned legitimacy. No universal principle determines what those rights and duties shall be, but over time societies tend to create images of the ideal citizen and direct individuals to aspire to them (Marshall 1964). In contrast to this legalistic notion of citizenship, there is a broader, less state-bound characterisation which sees it as comprising a repertoire of practices that people inherit and devise in order to co-exist interdependently with others. In this broader sense, to act as a citizen is to engage in public situations of various kinds with people one might not know and who might not share one’s interests, tastes, values, or even language. Sometimes civic interactions will involve relations with governments, authorities, or employers. At other times they will relate to quotidian ways of living amongst neighbours and strangers. Performances of citizenship are both framed institutionally, conforming to conventional notions of political and civic participation (voting, joining parties and campaigns, following the news) and improvised from below, often transcending or resisting established civic scripts. 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Moves to democratise crisis response are bound to consider fundamental questions about who constitutes “the public” (given the need to respond to social challenges that transcend political borders); how civic discourse is mediated (given the need to generate global narratives, conversations and concerted actions in the face of common threats) and how political differences can be both recognised and negotiated (given the urgent need for pluralistic publics to work through complex problems). It is to these questions that we now turn. Constituting the Public Domain The global pandemic has brought into sharp focus the spatial framing of political problems within national boundaries. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, politics has been conceived as “taking place” within national units characterised by territorial borders, sovereign authority, civically attached populations and bounded economic interests. The emergence of nation-states as a natural scale of political action and analysis is the defining feature of the Westphalian order in which to govern is to protect and enhance national state interests; to be a citizen is to belong to a nation state, thereby bound by specific geo-political responsibilities and rights; and to speak of democracy in an empirically meaningful sense is to refer to a mode of legitimacy operating at the nation-state level. The Westphalian view of political place established a firm distinction between domestic and foreign domains; inside and outside; the scope of national control and extraneous precariousness. The robustness of these conceptual categories of inter-national social order have been called into question by the speed and density of global economic and cultural interconnections that have become increasingly manifest since the late twentieth century. The conception of the globally dominant capitalist market as a “world system” was elaborated in the mid-1970s by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 390) who urged social scientists to abandon the reification of the nation-state as the primary unit of politico-economic analysis. He argued that capitalism could only operate as a world economy “with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems.” In short, states might be distinguished by cultural characteristics and domestic political projects, but they cannot escape their enmeshment in a global system of interdependent economic relations. Some theorists have celebrated globalisation as a modernising force, while others have warned against its homogenising flattening of cultures. Rejecting the simplistic notion of globalisation as “a single society and culture occupying the planet” (Waters 1995), more nuanced theorists have observed that the contemporary world is characterised by a marked tension between the specificity of place and the overriding dynamics of a global system. The latter frequently overrides the particularities of national statehood, economy and culture, while state actors do what they can to assert their independence. It makes sense to think of there being “multiple, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory globalisms” (Tsing 2000, 342), with states reshaping their territorial claims “on to both sub- and supra-national geographical scales” (Brenner 1999, 65). Such framing and reframing of political space depend as much upon symbolic mediation as upon the rules, treaties and logics of transnational institutions. In short, globalisation entails an ongoing struggle to tell people where and to what they belong. The Covid-19 health crisis is a primary example of this battle to frame a global event. Most people acknowledge that the pandemic is truly global, albeit disparately pernicious in different parts of the world, and at different times. In relation to the urgent need for global coordination to find a vaccine, the insular ambitions of nations or regions seem manifestly petty and irrelevant. However, that has not stopped nationalist leaders from playing blame games in which they ascribe the origin of the virus to nefarious foreign states, or from making boastful claims that their public health strategy is “world-beating” rather than simply functional. Rarely has the disconnect between bombastic national rhetoric and empirical global reality seemed more conspicuous. Given that the most pressing and intractable contemporary challenges can only be addressed through global coordination, the challenge of finding effective ways of communicating and acting beyond national silos seems more urgent than ever. From the spread of viruses to regulation of the environment, and from the direction of migration flows to the looming catastrophe of climate change, nation-states appear to be Canute-like before the irresistible waves of globalism. Left to themselves, nations squabble about who should take responsibility, constantly deferring meaningful action until others have made a move. The inescapably global nature of the pandemic has shown the futility and risk of such an approach, casting doubt upon the pursuit of national solutions and pointing towards the urgency of appeals to transnational public agency. Faced with globally diffuse problems of viral contagion, climate change and market instability, the civic case for stretching the use and meaning of the term “we, the public” becomes compelling. This important shift in collective self-consciousness entails the adoption of what Nancy Fraser (2007, 21) refers to as “the all-affected principle”: Today, … the idea that citizenship can serve as a proxy for affectedness is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, one’s conditions of living do not depend wholly on the internal constitution of the political community of which one is a citizen. Although the latter remains undeniably relevant, its effects are mediated by other structures, both extra and non-territorial, whose impact is at least as significant … In general, globalization is driving a widening wedge between affectedness and political membership. As those two notions increasingly diverge, the effect is to reveal the former as an inadequate surrogate for the latter. It follows from Fraser’s analysis that “what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not shared citizenship, but their co-imbrication in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives” (ibid, 22). The logic of the all-affected principle rejects the notion that only national publics can confer democratic legitimacy, as the latter depends upon registering the voices of all those who are potentially affected by a problem, notwithstanding their national labels. This amounts to a post-Westphalian conception of citizenship in which, rather than being fragmented by artificial political divisions, the public is characterised by its common vulnerabilities, experiences and capacities. Members of post-Westphalian publics will continue to disagree with one another, of course, but the public sphere within which such political disagreement takes place will correspond to the dimensions of the issues at stake.

To be clear, it is only through the emergence of a cosmopolitan public domain in which solidarities are rooted in common affectedness rather than national-legal identities that global challenges such as the pandemic and economic depression, as well as climate change and other environmental threats, can be tackled democratically. This does not amount to a utopian call for citizens to adopt an abstractly cosmopolitan stance. Already competing with discourses of nationalism and populism in contemporary societies are many millions of voices across the world who view social problems from the perspective of a universal humanity sharing a common home. Such people are more inclined “to take risks by virtue of encountering the ‘other’” and to possess “some ability to reflect upon and judge aesthetically between different natures, places and societies” (Szerszynskiand and Urry 2002, 470). By understanding that “[g]lobalisation has brought large swathes of the world’s population closer together” in overlapping communities of fate (Held 2003, 478), many contemporary campaigners for social justice frame their arguments in terms of a language of cosmopolitan sensibility. These include movements opposing the structural inequalities of transnational economic power (such as Occupy Wall Street), ecological depredation (the School Strike for Climate Change), institutional sexism (MeToo) and racism (Black Lives Matter). The effectiveness of these campaigns in bringing injustices to global attention does not entail abandoning national institutions and populations as if they no longer matter, but framing messages to affected citizens within a cosmopolitan context that celebrates openness to global heterogeneity, pluralism and nuance.

As the pandemic highlights the limitations of the Westphalian conception of “normal” by forcing people from across the world to face up to their interdependence, both in terms of the transnational porosity of contagion and the resources needed to contain it, it calls attention to the aptness of a “new normal” in which shared social problems are addressed on a new scale. This adjustment of scale calls into being new conceptions of the public, defined increasingly in terms of shared affectedness. Given that the most urgent crisis facing the world in the aftermath of the pandemic will be the threat of global catastrophe caused by climate change, the world is increasingly dependent upon the practical effectiveness of calls to action that are couched in a language of citizenship that transcends state borders and prioritises shared affectedness. The challenge of co-ordinating moral and political responses with a view to enhancing the public’s global agency is now a prerequisite for even modest success of efforts to save the planet from systemically wrought depredation. Could the public that has begun to develop a consciousness of its collective global vulnerability during the pandemic act upon such awareness beyond the current crisis?

### Case---2NC

#### 1AC solvency literally advocates for it

Daniele 1AC Archibugi 04. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy European Journal of International Relations Copyright 2004. “Cosmopolitan Democracy and its Critics: A Review”. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Daniele-Archibugi-2/publication/240701697\_Cosmopolitan\_Democracy\_and\_Its\_Critics\_A\_Review/links/5cc861b5299bf120978b3022/Cosmopolitan-Democracy-and-Its-Critics-A-Review.pdf

Marxist analysis maintains the existence of a permanent conflict of interests between rival social classes; interests that — now more than in the past — are in conflict not only within states, but also between states. The creation of a global citizenship will not put an end to these conflicts of interest, but that is not the ambition inspiring it. Its goal is simply to find institutional loci where these conflicts of interest could possibly be addressed and managed. If the prolonged civil war in Sierra Leone were somehow linked to the diamond trade, and the traders from Anvers, Moscow or New York were thought to play an effective role in promoting the instigation of the hostilities, what kind of institutional channels might prove effective in resolving the issue? Policies that are decided within international institutions — such as the certification of the diamonds’ origin — offer the possibility of mitigating the conflict. In other words, global institutions should offer effective channels for mending conflicts.

What needs to be revised is the political programme — not the spirit — of proletarian internationalism. Cosmopolitan democracy suggests the creation of institutions and representative channels not limited to a specific social class, but open to all individuals. Its aim is not to overcome social classes, but an objective more modest but equally ambitious — offering channels of direct representation to all people at the global level, regardless of their social status. This implies basing decision-making on global issues on the preferences of a majority, rather than on those of a single class. In this vein, Ulrich Beck (1999: 18) invoked, ‘Citizens of the world, unite!’

Trans-national campaigns have already succeeded in influencing the choices of political decision-makers — take the decision of the UK government to follow environmentally friendly procedures for the disposal of the Brent Spar (Prins and Sellwood, 1998); the institution of the International Criminal Court (Glasius, 2002); the decision of some multinationals to recede from their profit-making interests and allow for the free diffusion of the AIDS drug (Seckinelgin, 2002), or even military interventions to protect human rights (Kaldor, 2001). An international public sphere (Koehler, 1998; Cochran, 2002) is moving towards public action, and some partial but nevertheless significant results have been achieved (Pianta, 2003).

#### 4---PLURALISM---diverging interests are inevitable---even the most rational actors will disagree and the definition of justice will not be universal

Lior Erez 17, MINDSS Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the School of Political Science, University of Haifa “Anti-Cosmopolitanism and the Motivational Preconditions for Social Justice”, Florida State University Department of Philosophy, Social Theory and Practice, April 2017, Vol. 43, No. 2 (April 2017), pp. 249-282

1. The Stability Problem

The starting point of this analysis is the stability problem, as articulated in Rawls’s Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.3 In Rawls's formulation, principles of justice are constructed in the original position by “artificial” persons, who, while ignorant of their own conception of the good, arc able to make general assumptions regarding the nature of the good that they would want to pursue. As has been pointed out by several recent accounts, however, this stage is only a pro tanto justification of a conception of justice.4 For a conception of justice to be fully justified, it has to be shown that it would be stable, that is, that people with differing conceptions of the good will come to endorse it.5 The question of stability is not a problem to be dealt with later, once the right conception of justice has been chosen and justified. It is, rather, part of the justification process itself.6

In what way would any particular conception of justice fail to engender a desire to act upon it? The problem of stability arises when the two moral powers recognized by Rawls—the sense of justice and the rational pursuit of the good—are in conflict. This clash is inevitable because of the pluralist nature of different individuals' interests, what Rawls calls the “fact of pluralism’’ in liberal society. This pluralism is not a result of an unfortunate reality; it is rather “the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.”7 Because of the burdens of judgment, i.e., the limitations on practical reason, even rational people acting in good faith will disagree in their moral and philosophical judgments.

Given the potential clash between the principles of justice and their interests, each individual in the well-ordered society is faced with what Rawls calls a “generalized prisoner's dilemma”: while each could potentially maximize their interests by regulating their behavior in accordance with the principles of justice, each is faced with the temptation to defect, or free-ride, as to improve one’s position at the expense of others.

This scenario could be represented with two social actors, A and B, and units of welfare. If A and B both cooperate, they will each receive 2 units, while mutual defection will result in one unit each. If A cooperates and B defects, A will receive nothing while B will get 3 units (the same logic applies when B cooperates and A defects). Defecting is the dominant strategy for any rational actor, since no matter what the other actor does, it is always rational to defect. Since both actors are rational, this results in the sub-optimal case of mutual defection being a dominant strategy.

Even if it could be shown that each individual would prefer everyone’s actions to be regulated by the principles of justice, we are still faced with the problem of the “Assurance Game.” In this scenario, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, each prefers mutual cooperation to self-interested defection, and prefers to comply, if all (or most) others comply. But since each prefers to defect if all others defect, rather than to suffer the costs of picking up the slack when others free-ride, the situation is still unstable unless all can be assured that others will cooperate.

Unless some sort of mutual assurance is provided that others will not defect, people would prefer to reject the ideal of justice as regulative. The principles of justice will be unstable and thus, otiose.8

There are, therefore, two issues to be solved in order to secure the stability of the normative ideal of justice. First, that people will have an active sense of justice; and second, that the principles of justice will be regulative of people’s behavior, i.e., that even when people are faced with the opportunity to defect they will not do so. In other words, it needs to be shown that it will be rational for people to grant justice a regulative status in their practical reasoning. In Rawls’s terms, “the hazards of the generalized prisoner’s dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the good,” or, differently stated, between the reasonable and the rational.9 The challenge for any account of justice, therefore, is to demonstrate how the right and the good will be matched, without relying on a fortunate contingency.

Note that this way of articulating the stability problem avoids two common misconceptions about Rawls's account. First, it is clear that the problem does not belong to the realm of non-ideal theory: i.e., it does not ask how we get non-compliant citizens to comply with justified conceptions of justice in the actual social world.10 Second, some of Rawls’s readers assume that, since the stability problem is discussed within ideal theory, it is resolved with the introduction of the sense of justice.11 In Rawls’s moral psychology, however, the desire to do what is just is conditional upon the knowledge that others would reciprocate; a conception of right does not have independent motivating power, unrelated to any rational ends, as this cannot account for any reason-giving power of the sense of justice, and the decision to make justice regulative of other desires becomes arbitrary'.12 Importantly, even if the sense of justice has some motivating power, it needs to be shown that it will be regulative of people’s conceptions of the good in order to solve the assurance problem.13

#### 5---nation-state paradigm is too sutured into society---BUT the response should redirect it towards egalitarian ends, rather a haphazard disavowal.

Robert Sapolsky 19, Professor of Biology, Neurosurgery, and Neurology and Neurological Sciences at Stanford University, "This Is Your Brain on Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-02-12/your-brain-nationalism>. language edited.

If such is the violent reality of life as an ape, is it at all surprising that humans, who share more than 98 percent of their DNA with chimps, also divide the world into “us” and “them” and go to war over these categories? Reductive comparisons are, of course, dangerous; humans share just as much of their DNA with bonobos, among whom such brutal behavior is unheard of. And although humans kill not just over access to a valley but also over abstractions such as ideology, religion, and economic power, they are unrivaled in their ability to change their behavior. (The Swedes spent the seventeenth century rampaging through Europe; today they are, well, the Swedes.) Still, humankind’s best and worst moments arise from a system that incorporates everything from the previous second’s neuronal activity to the last million years of evolution (along with a complex set of social factors). To understand the dynamics of human group identity, including the resurgence of nationalism—that potentially most destructive form of in-group bias—requires grasping the biological and cognitive underpinnings that shape them.

Such an analysis offers little grounds for optimism. Our brains distinguish between in-group members and outsiders in a fraction of a second, and they encourage us to be kind to the former but hostile to the latter. These biases are automatic and unconscious and emerge at astonishingly young ages. They are, of course, arbitrary and often fluid. Today’s “them” can become tomorrow’s “us.” But this is only poor consolation. Humans can rein in their instincts and build societies that divert group competition to arenas less destructive than warfare, yet the psychological bases for tribalism persist, even when people understand that their loyalty to their nation, skin color, god, or sports team is as random as the toss of a coin. At the level of the human mind, little prevents new teammates from once again becoming tomorrow’s enemies.

TRIBAL MINDS

The human mind’s propensity for us-versus-them thinking runs deep. Numerous careful studies have shown that the brain makes such distinctions automatically and with mind-boggling speed. Stick a volunteer in a brain scanner and quickly flash pictures of faces. Among typical white subjects in the scanner, the sight of a black man’s face activates the amygdala, a brain region central to emotions of fear and aggression, in under one-tenth of a second. In most cases, the prefrontal cortex, a region crucial for impulse control and emotional regulation, springs into action a second or two later and silences the amygdala: “Don’t think that way, that’s not who I am.” Still, the initial reaction is usually one of fear, even among those who know better.

This finding is no outlier. Looking at the face of someone of the same race activates a specialized part of the primate brain called the fusiform cortex, which recognizes faces, but it is activated less so when the face in question is that of someone of another race. Watching the hand of someone of the same race being poked with a needle activates the anterior cingulate cortex, a region implicated in feelings of empathy; being shown the same with the hand of a person of another race produces less activation. Not everyone’s face or pain counts equally.

At every turn, humans make automatic, value-laden judgments about social groups. Suppose you are prejudiced against ogres, something you normally hide. Certain instruments, such as the Implicit Association Test, will reveal your prejudice nonetheless. A computer screen alternates between faces and highly emotive terms, such as “heroic” or “ignorant.” In response, you are asked to quickly press one of two buttons. If the button pairings fit your biases (“press Button A for an ogre’s face or a negative term and Button B for a human face or a positive term”), the task is easy, and you will respond rapidly and accurately. But if the pairings are reversed (“press Button A for a human face or a negative term and Button B for an ogre’s face or a positive term”), your responses will slow. There’s a slight delay each time, as the dissonance of linking ogres with “graceful” or humans with “smelly” gums you up for a few milliseconds. With enough trials, these delays are detectable, revealing your anti-ogre bias—or, in the case of actual subjects, biases against particular races, religions, ethnicities, age groups, and body types.

Needless to say, many of these biases are acquired over time. Yet the cognitive structures they require are often present from the outset. Even infants prefer those who speak their parents’ language. They also respond more positively to—and have an easier time remembering—faces of people of their parents’ race. Likewise, three-year-olds tend to prefer people of their own race and gender. This is not because children are born with innate racist beliefs, nor does it require that parents actively or implicitly teach their babies racial or gender biases, although infants can pick up such environmental influences at a very young age, too. Instead, infants like what is familiar, and this often leads them to copy their parents’ ethnic and linguistic in-group categorizations.

Sometimes the very foundations of affection and cooperation are also at the root of humankind’s darker impulses. Consider oxytocin, a compound whose reputation as a fuzzy “cuddle hormone” has recently taken a bit of a hit. In mammals, oxytocin is central to mother-infant bonding and helps create close ties in monogamous couples. In humans, it promotes a whole set of pro-social behaviors. Subjects given oxytocin become more generous, trusting, empathic, and expressive. Yet recent findings suggest that oxytocin prompts people to act this way only toward in-group members—their teammates in a game, for instance. Toward outsiders, it makes them aggressive and xenophobic. Hormones rarely affect behavior this way; the norm is an effect whose strength simply varies in different settings. Oxytocin, however, deepens the fault line in our brains between “us” and “them.”

Put simply, neurobiology, endocrinology, and developmental psychology all paint a grim picture of our lives as social beings. When it comes to group belonging, humans don’t seem too far from the families of chimps killing each other in the forests of Uganda: people’s most fundamental allegiance is to the familiar. Anything or anyone else is likely to be met, at least initially, with a measure of skepticism, fear, or hostility. In practice, humans can second-guess and tame their aggressive tendencies toward the Other. Yet doing so is usually a secondary, corrective step.

TURBANS TO HIPSTER BEARDS

For all this pessimism, there is a crucial difference between humans and those warring chimps. The human tendency toward in-group bias runs deep, but it is relatively value-neutral. Although human biology makes the rapid, implicit formation of us-them dichotomies virtually inevitable, who counts as an outsider is not fixed. In fact, it can change in an instant.

For one, humans belong to multiple, overlapping in-groups at once, each with its own catalog of outsiders—those of a different religion, ethnicity, or race; those who root for a different sports team; those who work for a rival company; or simply those have a different preference for, say, Coke or Pepsi. Crucially, the salience of these various group identities changes all the time. Walk down a dark street at night, see one of “them” approaching, and your amygdala screams its head off. But sit next to that person in a sports stadium, chanting in unison in support of the same team, and your amygdala stays asleep. Similarly, researchers at the University of California, Santa Barbara, have shown that subjects tend to quickly and automatically categorize pictures of people by race. Yet if the researchers showed their subjects photos of both black and white people wearing two different colored uniforms, the subjects automatically began to categorize the people by their uniforms instead, paying far less attention to race. Much of humans’ tendency toward in-group/out-group thinking, in other words, is not permanently tied to specific human attributes, such as race. Instead, this cognitive architecture evolved to detect any potential cues about social coalitions and alliances—to increase one’s chance of survival by telling friend from foe. The specific features that humans focus on to make this determination vary depending on the social context and can be easily manipulated.

Even when group boundaries remain fixed, the traits people implicitly associate with “them” can change—think, for instance, about how U.S. perceptions of different immigrant groups have shifted over time. Whether a dividing line is even drawn at all varies from place to place. I grew up in a neighborhood in New York with deep ethnic tensions, only to discover later that Middle America barely distinguishes between my old neighborhood’s “us” and “them.” In fact, some actors spend their entire careers alternating between portraying characters of one group and then the other.

This fluidity and situational dependence is uniquely human. In other species, in-group/out-group distinctions reflect degrees of biological relatedness, or what evolutionary biologists call “kin selection.” Rodents distinguish between a sibling, a cousin, and a stranger by smell—fixed, genetically determined pheromonal signatures—and adapt their cooperation accordingly. Those murderous groups of chimps are largely made up of brothers or cousins who grew up together and predominantly harm outsiders.

Humans are plenty capable of kin-selective violence themselves, yet human group mentality is often utterly independent of such instinctual familial bonds. Most modern human societies rely instead on cultural kin selection, a process allowing people to feel closely related to what are, in a biological sense, total strangers. Often, this requires a highly active process of inculcation, with its attendant rituals and vocabularies. Consider military drills producing “bands of brothers,” unrelated college freshmen becoming sorority “sisters,” or the bygone value of welcoming immigrants into “the American family.” This malleable, rather than genetically fixed, path of identity formation also drives people to adopt arbitrary markers that enable them to spot their cultural kin in an ocean of strangers—hence the importance various communities attach to flags, dress, or facial hair. The hipster beard, the turban, and the “Make America Great Again” hat all fulfill this role by sending strong signals of tribal belonging.

Moreover, these cultural communities are arbitrary when compared to the relatively fixed logic of biological kin selection. Few things show this arbitrariness better than the experience of immigrant families, where the randomness of a visa lottery can radically reshuffle a child’s education, career opportunities, and cultural predilections. Had my grandparents and father missed the train out of Moscow that they instead barely made, maybe I’d be a chain-smoking Russian academic rather than a Birkenstock-wearing American one, moved to tears by the heroism during the Battle of Stalingrad rather than that at Pearl Harbor. Scaled up from the level of individual family histories, our big-picture group identities—the national identities and cultural principles that structure our lives—are just as arbitrary and subject to the vagaries of history.

REVOLUTION OR REFORM?

That our group identities—national and otherwise—are random makes them no less consequential in practice, for better and for worse. At its best, nationalism and patriotism can prompt people to pay their taxes and care for their nation’s have-nots, including unrelated people they have never met and will never meet. But because this solidarity has historically been built on strong cultural markers of pseudo-kinship, it is easily destabilized, particularly by the forces of globalization, which can make people who were once the archetypes of their culture feel irrelevant and bring them into contact with very different sorts of neighbors than their grand-parents had. Confronted with such a disruption, tax-paying civic nationalism can quickly devolve into something much darker: a dehumanizing hatred that turns Jews into “vermin,” Tutsis into “cockroaches,” or Muslims into “terrorists.” Today, this toxic brand of nationalism is making a comeback across the globe, spurred on by political leaders eager to exploit it for electoral advantage.

In the face of this resurgence, the temptation is strong to appeal to people’s sense of reason. Surely, if people were to understand how arbitrary nationalism is, the concept would appear ludicrous. Nationalism is a product of human cognition, so cognition should be able to dismantle it, too.

Yet this is wishful thinking. In reality, knowing that our various social bonds are essentially random does little to weaken them. Working in the 1970s, the psychologist Henri Tajfel called this “the minimal group paradigm.” Take a bunch of strangers and randomly split them into two groups by tossing a coin. The participants know the meaninglessness of the division. And yet within minutes, they are more generous toward and trusting of members of their in-group. Tails prefer not to be in the company of Heads, and vice versa. The pull of us-versus-them thinking is strong even when the arbitrariness of social boundaries is utterly transparent, to say nothing of when it is woven into a complex narrative about loyalty to the [homeland] ~~fatherland~~. You can’t reason people out of a stance they weren’t reasoned into in the first place.

Modern society may well be stuck with nationalism and many other varieties of human divisiveness, and it would perhaps be more productive to harness these dynamics rather than fight or condemn them. Instead of promoting jingoism and xenophobia, leaders should appeal to people’s innate in-group tendencies in ways that incentivize cooperation, accountability, and care for one’s fellow humans. Imagine a nationalist pride rooted not in a country’s military power or ethnic homogeneity but in the ability to take care of its elderly, raise children who score high on tests of empathy, or ensure a high degree of social mobility. Such a progressive nationalism would surely be preferable to one built on myths of victimhood and dreams of revenge. But with the temptation of mistaking the familiar for the superior still etched into the mind, it is not beyond the human species to go to war over which country’s people carry out the most noble acts of random kindness. The worst of nationalism, then, is unlikely to be overcome anytime soon.

### Case---AT: Nationalism Impact---2NC

#### Nationalism’s not inherently violent---BUT the ALT can’t solve it anyway.

Rosario Forlenza 20, Fellow at the Remarque Institute, New York University and at Potsdam University’s Center for Citizenship, Social Pluralism, and Religious Diversity, “Nation as Home: Anthropological Foundations and Human Needs,” Bringing the Nation Back In: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and the Struggle to Define a New Politics, Chapter 9, pg 176-177

This paper has argued that dominant political theory and social science analysis of nations and nationalism are blind to the crucial question of background experiences, or the latent and hidden experiential and anthropological practices that take for granted the reference point of human life, the experience of home. To have a home or share an experience of home is the solid and basic necessary basis for human life (for any human life) to have a meaning.

Nations and nationalism must be understood as the translation of the need to have a home—or to share the experience of home—into a larger political entity, a participation in a broader cosmic entity, and the creation of political allegiance under conditions of existential uncertainty. Intellectuals and observers do not usually understand that nationalism has been such a powerful phenomenon precisely because it is based on the endless revaluation and symbolization of the nation-state as home, which cannot be simply overcome with the cosmopolitan paradigm of taking the world as home.

Historical experiences show that the anthropological need to share a home can crystallize in political revolution and war and become the master narrative of nationalism that blossoms into a fully developed, violent, and exclusionary doctrine. However, this process of abstraction is by no means unidirectional, and highly elaborated nationalism can open to a healthier sense of the nation as home. After all, although nationalism has not often proved to be great at creating multiethnic coalitions, specific egalitarian redistributive politics have historically been correlated with national projects. In short, the nation can be based on recognition and familiarity—an important term for all its banality. The nation in this sense can exclude abstraction, alienation, and violence aggressively pitched against the other/ the enemies. Boundaries and borders between “homes” can re-unify common things between individuals and communities. Or, to put differently, there are not common things to share without boundaries and borders.

Membership in a cosmopolitan world produces a weak form of identity and an ideological-legalistic construct, which cannot serve as the basis of commonalities, shared identities, and meaningful political communities—all of which are necessary to address the tearing of the world. A meaningful, stable political allegiance must engage peoples’ energies and values by drawing forth the existential dimension of human beings and their experience of home as expressed in cultural and anthropological practices rooted in localizing processes.

## 1NR

### Internationalism PIC---1NR

#### Internationalism is founded on nationalism---regardless of context, reject it.

Roger Alford 8, Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame Law School, J.D. from New York University, “Internationalism vs. Cosmopolitanism,” OpinioJuris, 1/10/2008, <http://opiniojuris.org/2008/01/10/internationalism-vs-cosmopolitanism/>

* Modified for gendered language

It is obvious that there is a great deal of difference between being international and being cosmopolitan. All good men are international. Nearly all bad men are cosmopolitan. If we are to be international we must be national. And it is largely because those who call themselves the friends of peace have not dwelt sufficiently on this distinction that they do not impress the bulk of any of the nations to which they belong. International peace means a peace between nations, not a peace after the destruction of nations, like the Buddhist peace after the destruction of personality. The golden age of the good European is like the heaven of the Christian: it is a place where people will love each other; not like the heaven of the Hindu, a place where they will be each other. And in the case of national character this can be seen in a curious way. It will generally be found, I think, that the more a ~~man~~ [person] really appreciates and admires the soul of another people the less ~~he~~ [they] will attempt to imitate it; he will be conscious that there is something in it too deep and too unmanageable to imitate. The Englishman who has a fancy for France will try to be French; the Englishman who admires France will remain obstinately English. This is to be particularly noticed in the case of our relations with the French, because it is one of the outstanding peculiarities of the French that their vices are all on the surface, and their extraordinary virtues concealed. One might almost say that their vices are the flower of their virtues.

#### It supercharges all of their offense---it’s an investment into relations among sovereign states AND among the polity of nations.

Tomaž Mastnak 17, Research Scholar at the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, Princeton University, “Nationalism, Internationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Colonialism”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Volume 37, Number 2, August 2017, Jstor

For Kant, cosmopolitanism was a remedy to what he called “national delusions.” But the cure he envisaged for the “Nationalwahn” was legally framed relations among legally defined nations (as territorially limited multitudes associated within a civic whole). Kant’s remedy presupposed that each state was to be a free state and aimed at the preservation of that freedom. His maxim was: Salus civitatis suprema lex esto (The welfare of the state should be the supreme law).12 Rather than overcoming nations, cosmopolitanism here referred to international order. It meant relations among nations = states (republics) regulated by reason. Cosmopolitanism, that is, meant international law.

Logically, the term *internationalism* means relations among nations — not the supersession of nations. But the political meanings of internationalism are bound to specific historical contexts. Chatterjee looks at two cases: the Third International and the nonaligned movement. The latter is a perfect example of efforts to support the establishment and preservation of national independence, that is, of sovereign states, based on the principle of equality enshrined in international law. The leading principle of the nonaligned movement was the Kantian “salus civitatis” (and not the humanitarian interventionist “salus civium”).13

#### Their ev says rejecting the conception of states is key---internationalism’s foundation is in tension with that.

* Kentucky reads yellow

Nancy Fraser 5. Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School. “Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, NLR 36, November–December 2005.” New Left Review. https://newleftreview-org.proxy.library.emory.edu/issues/ii36/articles/nancy-fraser-reframing-justice-in-a-globalizing-world

But the claims of transformative politics go further still. Above and beyond their other demands, these movements are also claiming a say in a post-Westphalian process of frame-setting. Rejecting the standard view, which deems frame-setting the prerogative of states and transnational elites, they are effectively aiming to democratize the process by which the frameworks of justice are drawn and revised. Asserting their right to participate in constituting the ‘who’ of justice, they are simultaneously transforming the ‘how’—by which I mean the accepted procedures for determining the ‘who’. At their most reflective and ambitious, accordingly, transformative movements are demanding the creation of new democratic arenas for entertaining arguments about the frame. In some cases, moreover, they are creating such arenas themselves. In the World Social Forum, for example, some practitioners of transformative politics have fashioned a transnational public sphere where they can participate on a par with others in airing and resolving disputes about the frame. In this way, they are prefiguring the possibility of new institutions of post-Westphalian democratic justice.footnote16

The democratizing dimension of transformative politics points to a third level of political injustice, above and beyond the two already discussed. Previously, I distinguished first-order injustices of ordinary-political misrepresentation from second-order injustices of misframing. Now, however, we can discern a third-order species of political injustice, which corresponds to the question of the ‘how’. Exemplified by undemocratic processes of frame-setting, this injustice consists in the failure to institutionalize parity of participation at the meta-political level, in deliberations and decisions concerning the ‘who’. Because what is at stake here is the process by which first-order political space is constituted, I shall call this injustice meta-political misrepresentation. Meta-political misrepresentation arises when states and transnational elites monopolize the activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process, and blocking creation of democratic arenas where the latter’s claims can be vetted and redressed. The effect is to exclude the overwhelming majority of people from participation in the meta-discourses that determine the authoritative division of political space. Lacking any institutional arenas for such participation, and submitted to an undemocratic approach to the ‘how’, the majority is denied the chance to engage on terms of parity in decision-making about the ‘who’.

#### Their research matters---any reinvestment in the nation-state via internationalism overdetermines their advocacy.

* Kentucky reads yellow

Ulrich Beck & Natan Sznaider 10. Ulrich Beck. Department of Sociology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat Munich. Natan Sznaider, School of Behavioral Sciences, Academic College of Tel-Aviv Yaffo, Israel. "Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda". Wiley Online Library. 1-15-2010. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01250.x

Indeed, the basic idea behind this special issue of the British Journal of Sociology is that ‘the light of the great cultural problems has moved on’ from a nation-state definition of society and politics to a cosmopolitan outlook. At this point the humanities and social sciences need to get ready for a transformation of their own positions and conceptual equipment – that is, to take cosmopolitanism as a research agenda seriously and raise some of the key conceptual, methodological, empirical and normative issues that the cosmopolitanization of reality poses for the social sciences. The intellectual undertaking of redefining cosmopolitanism is a trans-disciplinary one, which includes geography, anthropology, ethnology, international relations, international law, political philosophy and political theory, and now sociology and social theory (see Beck and Sznaider 2006). Cosmopolitanism is, of course, a contested term; there is no uniform interpretation of it in the growing literature. The boundaries separating it from competitive terms like globalization, transnationalism, universalism, glocalization etc. are not distinct and internally it is traversed by all kind of fault lines. Yet we will argue that the neo-cosmopolitanism in the social sciences –‘realistic cosmopolitanism’ or ‘cosmopolitan realism’– is an identifiable intellectual movement united by at least three interconnected commitments:

First, the shared critique of methodological nationalism which blinds conventional sociology to the multi-dimensional process of change that has irreversibly transformed the very nature of the social world and the place of states within that world. Methodological nationalism does not mean (as the term ‘methodological individualism’ suggests) that one or many sociologists have consciously created an explicit methodology (theory) based on an explicit nationalism. The argument rather goes that social scientists in doing research or theorizing take it for granted that society is equated with national society, as Durkheim does when he reflects on the integration of society. He, of course, has in mind the integration of the national society (France) without even mentioning, naming or thinking about it. In fact, not using the adjective ‘national’ as a universal language does not falsify but might sometimes even prove methodological nationalism. That is the case when the practice of the argument or the research presupposes that the unit of analysis is the national society or the national state or the combination of both. The concept of methodological nationalism is not a concept of methodology but of the sociology of sociology or the sociology of social theory.

Second, the shared diagnosis that the twenty-first century is becoming an age of cosmopolitanism. This could and should be compared with other historical moments of cosmopolitanism, such as those in ancient Greece, the Alexandrian empire and the Enlightenment. In the 1960s Hannah Arendt analysed the Human Condition, in the 1970s Francois Lyotard the Postmodern Condition. Now at the beginning of the twenty-first century we have to discover, map and understand the Cosmopolitan Condition.

Third, there is a shared assumption that for this purpose we need some kind of ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’. Of course, there is a lot of controversy about what this means. The main point for us lies in the fact that the dualities of the global and the local, the national and the international, us and them, have dissolved and merged together in new forms that require conceptual and empirical analysis. The outcome of this is that the concept and phenomena of cosmopolitanism are not spatially fixed; the term itself is not tied to the ‘cosmos’ or the ‘globe’, and it certainly does not encompass ‘everything’. The principle of cosmopolitanism can be found in specific forms at every level and can be practiced in every field of social and political action: in international organizations, in bi-national families, in neighbourhoods, in global cities, in transnationalized military organizations, in the management of multi-national co-operations, in production networks, human rights organizations, among ecology activists and the paradoxical global opposition to globalization.

Critique of methodological nationalism

Methodological nationalism takes the following premises for granted: it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political organization.

The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boundaries with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily across, these divisions:

[Like] stamp collecting . . . social scientists collected distinctive national social forms. Japanese industrial relations, German national character, the American constitution, the British class system – not to mention the more exotic institutions of tribal societies – were the currency of social research. The core disciplines of the social sciences, whose intellectual traditions are reference points for each other and for other fields, were therefore domesticated– in the sense of being preoccupied not with Western and world civilization as wholes but with the ‘domestic’ forms of particular national societies (Shaw 2000: 68).

The critique of methodological nationalism should not be confused with the thesis that the end of the nation-state has arrived. One does not criticize methodological individualism by proclaiming the end of the individual. Nation-states (as all the research shows – see also the different contributions in this volume) will continue to thrive or will be transformed into transnational states. What, then, is the main point of the critique of methodological nationalism? It adopts categories of practice as categories of analysis. The decisive point is that national organization as a structuring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social scientific observer. One cannot even understand the re-nationalization or re-ethnification trend in Western or Eastern Europe without a cosmopolitan perspective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond adequately to the challenge of globalization if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically fundamental questions within specialized fields of research, and thereby elaborate the foundations of a newly formulated cosmopolitan social science.

As many authors – including the ones in this volume – criticize, in the growing discourse on cosmopolitanism there is a danger of fusing the ideal with the real. What cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be separated from what cosmopolitanism should be. But the same is true of nationalism. The small, but important, difference is that in the case of nationalism the value judgment of the social scientists goes unnoticed because methodological nationalism includes a naturalized conception of nations as real communities. In the case of the cosmopolitan ‘Wertbeziehung’ (Max Weber, value relation), by contrast, this silent commitment to a nation-state centred outlook of sociology appears problematic.

In order to unpack the argument in the two cases it is necessary to distinguish between the actor perspective and the observer perspective. From this it follows that a sharp distinction should be made between methodological and normative nationalism. The former is linked to the social-scientific observer perspective, whereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of political actors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self-determination within the context of its cultural, political and even geographical boundaries and distinctiveness. Methodological nationalism assumes this normative claim as a socio-ontological given and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organization orientations of society and politics. These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of the social sciences. Indeed, this social-scientific stance is part of the nation-state's own self-understanding. A national view on society and politics, law, justice, memory and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of the social sciences has become a prisoner of the nation-state. That this was not always the case is shown in Bryan Turner's paper in this issue (Turner 2006: 133–51). This does not mean, of course, that a cosmopolitan social science can and should ignore different national traditions of law, history, politics and memory. These traditions exist and become part of our cosmopolitan methodology. The comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and law all essentially function on the basis of methodological nationalism. This is valid to the extent that the majority of positions in the contemporary debates in social and political science over globalization can be systematically interpreted as transdisciplinary reflexes linked to methodological nationalism.

These premises also structure empirical research, for example, in the choice of statistical indicators, which are almost always exclusively national. A refutation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical viewpoint is therefore difficult, indeed, almost impossible, because so many statistical categories and research procedures are based on it. It is therefore of historical importance for the future development of the social sciences that this methodological nationalism, as well as the related categories of perception and disciplinary organization, be theoretically, empirically, and organizationally re-assessed and reformed.

What is at stake here? Whereas in the case of the nation-state centred perspective there is an historical correspondence between normative and methodological nationalism (and for this reason this correspondence has mainly remained latent), this does not hold for the relationship between normative and methodological cosmopolitanism. In fact, the opposite is true: even the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures and institutions has to be analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of reference.

Cosmopolitan social science entails the systematic breaking up of the process through which the national perspective of politics and society, as well as the methodological nationalism of political science, sociology, history, and law, confirm and strengthen each other in their definitions of reality. Thus it also tackles (what had previously been analytically excluded as a sort of conspiracy of silence of conflicting basic convictions) the various developmental versions of de-bounded politics and society, corresponding research questions and programmes, the strategic expansions of the national and international political fields, as well as basic transformations in the domains of state, politics, and society.

This paradigmatic de-construction and re-construction of the social sciences from a national to a cosmopolitan outlook can be understood and methodologically justified as a ‘positive problem shift’ (Lakatos 1970), a broadening of horizons for social science research making visible new realities encouraging new research programmes (Beck and Lau 2005; Beck, Bonss and Lau 2003: 1–35). Against the background of cosmopolitan social science, it suddenly becomes obvious that it is neither possible to distinguish clearly between the national and the international, nor, correspondingly, to make a convincing contrast between homogeneous units. National spaces have become denationalized, so that the national is no longer national, just as the international is no longer international. New realities are arising: a new mapping of space and time, new co-ordinates for the social and the political are emerging which have to be theoretically and empirically researched and elaborated.

This entails a re-examination of the fundamental concepts of ‘modern society’. Household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, memory and politics must be released from the fetters of methodological nationalism, re-conceptualized, and empirically established within the framework of a new cosmopolitan social and political science. It would be hard to understate the scope of this task. But nevertheless it has to be taken up if the social sciences want to avoid becoming a museum of antiquated ideas.

#### ‘Internationalism’ means cooperation among discrete nations

Merriam Webster’s 22 Online Dictionary, ‘internationalism’, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/internationalism

Definition of internationalism

1: international character, principles, interests, or outlook

2a: a policy of cooperation among nations

b: an attitude or belief favoring such a policy

#### They’re definitionally distinct---the words are wrongly conflated.

Freebase 22 – “Definitions for Internationalism”, https://www.definitions.net/definition/internationalism

Internationalism

Internationalism is a movement which advocates a greater economic and political cooperation among nations for the theoretical benefit of all. Partisans of this movement, such as supporters of the World Federalist Movement, claim that nations should cooperate because their long-term mutual interests are of greater value than their individual short term needs. Internationalism is by nature opposed to ultranationalism, jingoism, realism and national chauvinism. Internationalism teaches that the people of all nations have more in common than they do differences, and thus that nations should treat each other as equals. The term internationalism is often wrongly used as a synonym for cosmopolitanism. 'Cosmopolitanist' is also sometimes used as a term of abuse for internationalists. Internationalism is not necessarily anti-nationalism, as in the People's Republic of China and stalinist countries.

#### The choice of even single words matters

Richard Reeves 5, Lecturer at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California “Words Matter in Politics”, The New Statesman, 1/24/2005, http://www.newstatesman.com/200501240022

What's in a word? In politics, everything, argues Richard Reeves. Get the language right and you can win arguments before they begin. US Republicans know this, but new Labour still has much to learn Words get a bad press. On both sides of the principal divide in British politics - the one between the media and politicians - the use of language is a familiar target. Journalists accuse politicians of spouting mere "rhetoric"; MPs on the Today programme suggest that their interlocutor is playing at "semantics". Politicians are said to be all spin and no substance, hacks to be interested in the juiciest, rather than most apposite, quotations. Yet rhetoric and semantics are not the froth of politics, but its most important ingredients. There can be no politics without words. And the precise meaning of words - for example, in the phrase "a representative House of Lords" - is hardly a trivial matter. Labour - sorry, new Labour - is all too aware of the significance of words. "Language," Aristotle wrote in the Politics, "serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse . . . It is the peculiarity of man . . . that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and unjust." In other words, what makes a political community ("a city", as Aristotle called it) is the shared concepts of good and evil, right and wrong - and only through language can this sharing take place. This insight is as valuable in the modern world as in antiquity. Those who worry about a United States of Europe can stop fretting: the absence of a common language prevents a commonly articulated vision of Europe. The gap extends even to musical pitch. The note "A" is different in France, Germany and Britain, so musicians squabble when they play together - a clear-cut case, surely, for EU harmonisation. By contrast, the US, which is a more diverse social, economic and cultural region than Europe, has a sense of Americanness that depends vitally on linguistic unity. (Note that John Kerry's ability to speak French counted against him in last year's election.) If a nation is defined, in the Cornell University professor Benedict Anderson's terms, as a shared "imagined community", the role of a shared language in filling the imagination becomes clear. If language shapes who we are, it also helps to determine where we are going. As Norman Fairclough, author of New Labour, New Language? says, words "do political work". Words do not simply express an already perfectly formed idea; they often help to test, refine and develop an idea. Ideas and words are like a chicken and an egg. Labour's search for the right language is a good example of the way language can determine political action. Early in 1996, for example, it looked as if "stakeholding" would be Labour's big idea. Popularised by Will Hutton in his book The State We're In the previous year, it was at the heart of a speech by Tony Blair in Singapore. But, after a brief moment in the sun, it was replaced by "rights and responsibilities" and then "the Third Way". Philip Gould, Blair's disciple and polling guru, argues that while "the language of stakeholding has withered, the new approach underpinning it has prospered". But he underestimates the power of language. If Labour had stuck with stakeholding, some of its policies would almost certainly have been different. In Singapore, Blair said: "It is surely time to assess how we shift the emphasis in corporate ethos from the company being a mere vehicle for the capital market - to be traded, bought and sold as a commodity - towards a vision of the company as a community of partnership in which each employee has a stake." It is not possible to square these words - a "community . . . in which each employee has a stake" - with Labour's laissez-faire attitude in government to company law, structure and capital financing. Another critical intersection between language and politics is the way words "frame" an issue in people's minds - often in ways which virtually predetermine their reaction. George Lakoff, a US linguist and semi-hero in some Democratic circles, shows how brilliantly effective the Republicans have been at using language frames. His latest book is entitled Don't Think of an Elephant!: and the point is, you can't. Once the word has been uttered, the image of a big grey animal is unstoppably in your mind. The frame is in place. The Republicans understand this. Two of their most effective framing devices are the relabelling of tax cuts as "tax relief" and the invention of the term "partial-birth abortion". The first of these is a powerful metaphor. Once "relief" is added to tax, Lakoff points out, it becomes "an affliction. The person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy." The Republicans use the phrase repeatedly: some right-wing think-tanks have swear-boxes for anyone who says "tax cut". Soon the media followed suit, referring to the Republicans' "tax relief plan". And once the Democrats were using it, the game was pretty much over. "Should we have tax relief?" is a question that contains its own answer. Bush has similarly used the metaphor of not needing a "permission slip" to defend America - which frames the issue of multinational talks in such a way as to suggest that anyone taking the UN seriously is clearly a schoolchild asking for teacher's say-so. (Someone in Michael Howard's office has clearly read Lakoff, because he, too, used the term recently. The trouble is that it is American English, and no one knew what he was on about.) "Partial-birth abortion" refers to a rare procedure where the surgeon partly delivers the baby but leaves the head in the womb while he removes the brain. But if it is so rare - 1 per cent of all abortions - why all the right-wing fuss? "Because," as Lakoff notes, "it is the first step to ending all abortion. It puts out there a frame of abortion as a horrendous procedure, when most operations ending pregnancy are nothing like this." Paul Chilton, in his Analysing Political Discourse, calls these "ready-made moulds for the thinking of thoughts". So far British politicians - along with most US Democrats - are amateurs at this stuff. Yet perhaps the best reframing in recent UK politics was by the left, in the successful rebadging of the Tory community charge as a poll tax. Who could oppose a simple charge for something as lovely as a community? On the other hand, who could support a tax on such a fundamental democratic right as the vote? When Conservative ministers started to slip up and refer to "the poll tax" in media interviews, you knew the fight was over. Framing is going on all the time, whether consciously or not. Even apparently banal terms such as "welfare-dependent", "yobs" and (the current favourite) "hard-working families" carry with them a heavy load of assumptions and implications. The political right uses the term "nanny state" very effectively, with the frame carrying associations of bossiness, dependency and childishness. Once a Labour politician defensively says "it's not a question of the nanny state, but of . . .", the rest of the sentence is almost not worth bothering with. The damage has been done. The choice of even single words can matter. As Chilton points out, the meanings of the words kill, murder, assassinate and execute can be defined "in terms of stored frames in which different types of actor fill the agent and the victim roles, the killing is legal or not legal", and so on. Similarly, the question of whether a person receiving treatment in a hospital is a "patient", "client", "user" or "customer" is a hugely important semantic one. The chosen frame carries a range of implications for where power lies, how doctors should interact with people and how the success of medical institutions is defined.

#### Language is functional

UH 4 – University of Hertfordshire School of Combined Studies, “Describing and Analysing Language”, http://www.uefap.com/courses/baecc/sfl/intro.htm

The approach taken for this description and analysis is Systemic-Functional Linguistics (SFL). This analytical approach is mainly taken from the work of Michael Halliday, in particular the model of language set out in An Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985, 1994 and Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), following on from Malinowski (1923), Firth (1957) and Hymes (1967) (Halliday & Hasan, 1985, pp. 5-9).

Systemic-functional linguistics has a number of beliefs that make it particularly useful as a basis for developing such a description:

\* Language is functional. That is, language is the way it is because of the meanings it makes. Resources available within the systems of semantics, grammar and vocabulary are utilised in specific ways to make specific meanings.

\* It is a theory of language in context, and suggests that language can only be understood in relation to the context in which it is used. So different purposes for using language and different contexts result in different texts. The construction of language texts in turn impacts on the context. There is thus a two-way relationship between text and context.

\* The process of using language is a semiotic process, a process of making meanings by choosing.

\* The theory focuses on language at the level of the whole text. This theory differs from most other approaches to language study, which offer systematic analyses of language only up to the level of sentence, and provides little guidance to the language learner, who needs to know about structure, organisation and development in connected oral discourse and written texts.